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Abstract 
After the 9/11 terror attacks against the US there have been concerns about how to positively 
identify every individual entering a country. As a direct result ePassports are now being 
issued in several countries all over the world. The International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) has developed the internationally applied standard for ePassports. The ICAO standard 
provides a guideline for what features that could or should be implemented in these passports. 
During the process of updating the standard several experts within security and privacy have 
argued that the standard is to weak.  
 
The ePassports include biometrics and other personal information on a RFID chip. The fact 
that the information is now available on an RFID chip provides more security concerns than if 
the information had only been available in the machine-readable zone and at the data page. 
The chip itself provides some possible security and privacy problems like issuance, 
encryption, read range and so on, but there are also other aspects to consider with 
implementation of RFID.  
 
If RFID is implemented it is very likely that a national or international database containing 
personal information about passport holders will also be implemented. This is because it is 
easier and faster to check travel history, criminal records and so forth if the passport is 
electronic crosschecked against the database. In addition, it will greatly increase the difficulty 
of passport fraud. If this database is to be implemented it is highly important that the security 
around it is the best it can be.  
 
In our studies we have found that the continuous work with the ICAO standard for Machine 
Readable Travel Documents will probably give a thorough revised and considered result. 
Even though we find it somewhat disturbing that there are so many aspects brought to the 
group’s attention by other security and privacy experts. 
 
As the US has pushed for use of biometrics in passports through the US VISA-Waiver 
Program, more and more countries find it useful to implement biometrics. Biometric features 
in passports will give a fairly accurate identification rate; especially if the applied biometric is 
fingerprints or iris scan. All ICAO members have to implement Machine Readable Passports 
(MRPs) by 2010, and we believe that many of these countries, if not all, will enhance it with 
biometrics in that period of time. 
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Foreword 
This report includes an analysis of the new biometric passport system, which is implemented 
in large parts of the world. The idea behind the report was to look at the security aspects 
facing such a big implantation as the ePassport system is. 
 
The project, which this report is a part of, is a part of the Master degree in Information and 
Communication Technology at Agder University College – Faculty of Technology. The 
project is accomplished in Arendal and Grimstad. The report will be of interest for anybody 
that is interested in security and the new ePassports, but some experience in the field of 
Information and Communication Technology would be beneficial. 
 
We give our sincere thanks to our supervisor Ola Torkild Aas for guidance through the 
project. We would also like to give our thanks to Atle Årnes at the Norwegian Data 
Inspectorate for providing us with quick and helpful answers to our questions. 
 
Grimstad, May 2006. 
Eili Bjelkåsen and Linda Walbeck Olsen 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 The Problem 
1.1.1 Statement of the problem 
Our study discusses whether the first generation of the new, biometrical passports are secure 
enough, from the governments’ perspective. The main focus is on the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) standard [1], which is used in some form by all countries that 
are part of the US Visa-Waiver program (VWP) [2]. If we find vulnerabilities in the standard 
or selected implementations thereof, we will if possible describe existing methods to 
eliminate, or at least improve these. 
 
1.1.2 Sub problems  
The first sub problem is to determine the quality of the ICAO standard, and evaluate the 
technical and practical solutions presented in the document. One problem immediately comes 
to attention: What is ‘secure enough’? The literature on security often describes algorithms 
that theoretically could be broken, but are complex enough to be computationally infeasible to 
break, as ‘secure enough’. This will be our starting point in describing what is secure, what is 
not secure and what is secure enough. (This problem itself can be divided into several sub 
problems, such as: The relationship between security and privacy; the security issues in the 
applied technology; the possible use and properties of an international control network; the 
growing concerns of the privacy-affiliated organizations and individuals all over the world; 
and the danger of possible fraud or forgery. We cannot effectively study all of these issues in 
detail, due to the limited time available. Instead, we will take a shallower look at all of them.) 
 
The second sub problem is to present and evaluate possible solutions to weaknesses we might 
find in the ICAO standard. 
 
The third sub problem is to view the implementation of the ICAO standard by chosen 
governments in search for differences that may or may not influence the quality of the 
international system. We will mainly focus on the US and Norwegian electronic passport, for 
several reasons. First, the US ePassport programme is one of the most public ones we have 
seen. The process of making US ePassports has been going on for some time, and has been 
easy to follow. We have seen several security and privacy issues publicly debated, and 
solutions have been devised. Also, the US is the country to begin the process of electronic 
passports, and is the first to require electronic passport from visitors. 
 
The Norwegian ePassport programme is clearly interesting to us as we are, obviously, 
Norwegian. In addition, Norway is the third European country (only beaten by Belgium and 
Sweden) to issue the ePassport, and is therefore one of the pioneering countries in the 
ePassport context. Norway is to some extent required to follow EU guidelines, but also has 
opportunity to make many of its own decisions. It is unknown how much information is 
available on the Norwegian program, so other countries’ passport implementations may be 
added. The new Scandinavian passports are, or will be, developed by the Finnish company 
Setec, so this company may become a source of information regarding the specifications of 
the Scandinavian electronic passports [3]. 
 
The fourth sub problem is to sum our findings, and determine as best we can whether the new 
electronic passports really are secure enough. Based on this, we can also try to recommend a 
minimum implementation that eliminates the most critical problems, if any. 
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1.1.3 Hypotheses 
Our first hypothesis is that the ICAO standard has some weaknesses, but that it is possible to 
eliminate or improve these, although probably at an increased financial cost. 
 
The biometrical passports are being implemented to combat forgery, among other reasons. 
Forgery, we claim, may however still be possible, especially if no particular measures are 
taken to ensure security. 
 
We also believe that the RFID-technology might still be too young and weak to be a 
completely secure means of making passports (partly) digital. 
 
The final hypothesis is that the different implementations of the governments can create new, 
previously undiscovered problems. 
 
1.1.4 Delimitations 
• We will not attempt to forge a biometric passport. 
• We will not try to discover and solve all problems concerning biometric passports. 
• We will not write a new standard for biometric passports 
• We will not discuss all implementations of biometric passports, only a selected few. 
(i.e. the Norwegian and US implementations).  
• We will not make a detailed study of the biometric passports technologies. 
 
1.1.5 Definition of Terms 
‘Biometric passport’: The new type of passports, which from October 2006 are required for 
entry to the US by the VWP. The passports must contain an RFID-chip, which holds digitized 
information about the passport’s owner. The individual government decides much of the 
specific digital information, but certain demands are made by the US and the ICAO standard. 
As an example, a digitized photo of the passport’s owner is required both by the standard and 
by the US. Some of the information on the passport must also be optically readable. Other 
terms used include ‘electronic’ or ‘digitized’ passports, or simply E-passports or ePassports. 
 
‘ePassport’: A term used for all passports that includes an electronic device, or Contactless 
Integrated Circuit (IC) such as a RFID chip. The RFID chip contains biometric data, so an 
ePassport is also a biometric passport. This definition is in compliance with the ICAO 
terminology. 
 
‘Standard’: A specification of procedures, technologies and other implementations of a 
principal. Used to ensure compatibility between different vendors, securing functionality, 
security, privacy and other features. A standard can be well established or it may not. The 
ICAO standard is a ‘de facto’ standard, meaning it is not yet ratified, but as there is no other, 
better standard, it is used. It may very well be ratified in the near future. The ISO standards, 
however, are ratified and well established. 
 
‘Duplex’: Two-ways, in IT terminology normally used to indicate that communication is 
going both ways between two interacting entities. 
 
‘Scandinavia’: The three neighboring countries Norway, Sweden and Denmark. 
 
‘Skimming’: An unauthorized read of information, in our case from an RFID chip. 
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‘Faraday Cage’: A capsule of radio wave blocking material, for example aluminium. Used to 
protect the RFID-chip in biometric passports from being read at other times than when 
reading is expected. 
 
‘Brute force’: A trial-and-error approach to break a cryptographic key or code. 
 
‘Man-in-the-middle’: An attack where the attacker places him-/herself invisibly between 
communicating entities relaying the communication, trying to steal keys, codes and/or 
information. 
 
‘Digital Signature’: “A digital signature is a construct that authenticates both the origin and 
contents of a message in a manner that is provable to a disinterested third party”[4]. In this 
context, and a more easily understandable language, this means that a digital signature is a 
way of guaranteeing that the data is not tampered with and that the (correct) government has 
issued it. However, the digital signature does not guarantee that the ePassport, or more 
precisely the RFID chip inside, is genuine. Digital signatures are made possible by a PKI (see 
abbreviations). 
 
‘Cipher’: A systemized way to change information into something only the people with the 
correct deciphering key can understand. This method of sharing secrets has probably been 
used in some form as long as people have communicated, at first using looks, body language, 
agreed-upon terms or other secret ‘keys’. When the written language was invented, the idea of 
replacing different symbols with others using some kind of mathematical or logical system 
was born. In modern cryptography, streams or fixed-size blocks of digital information are 
encrypted and decrypted using highly advanced cipher systems. For simplicity, we range the 
security level of a cipher system as ‘broken’, ‘broken but secure enough for insensitive 
information’, ‘computationally infeasible to break’ (meaning the computer calculation power 
needed to break the cipher is – not yet – available) or ‘not (yet) broken’. Broken also means 
susceptible to cryptanalytic attacks. 
 
1.1.6 Abbreviations 
RFID (chip): Radio Frequency IDentifier (chip) is a family of small chips that are capable of 
permanently and/or temporarily store information and duplex communication with a reader 
using radio waves. For more information see chapter 1.2.1. 
 
ICAO: the International Civil Aviation Organization, the issuer of the biometric passport 
standard currently being applied. The ISO 7501-1:2005 is a short form of the ICAO standard. 
 
ACLU: American Civil Liberties Union. The US’ “guardian of liberty”, the ACLU works in 
courts, legislatures and communities “to defend and preserve the individual rights and 
liberties guaranteed to every person in this country by the Constitution and laws of the United 
States” [5]. 
 
ISO: International Organization for Standardization. 
 
US-VISIT: United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology program [6]. 
 
MRTD: Machine-Readable Travel Documents, an abbreviation used by the ICAO, meaning 
machine-readable passports, visas and official travel documents. The machine readable 
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information is at present either contained in a machine-readable code or a Contactless 
Integrated Circuit (IC), i.e. an RFID chip. 
 
MRP: Machine-Readable Passport. See also the definition of MRTDs above, as a MRP is an 
example of an MRTD. MRP is the foundation for the new ePassport. 
 
VWP: The Visa Waiver Program, of which Norway participates, enables most citizens of the 
27 member countries to travel to the US for 90 days or less without having to obtain a visa 
[2]. These countries must from October 2006 provide their citizens with biometric passports 
to continue the program. The VWP is a part of the US-VISIT program. 
 
NSM: “Nasjonal Sikkerhets Myndighet”, the Norwegian National Security Authority is “A 
preemptive security service, which strives to protect sensitive information and objects from 
security threatening actions” [7]. 
 
BAC: Basic Access Control, a means to ensure that communicating entities are who they 
claim to be. More on this in section two of the literature review chapter. 
 
FAR: False Acceptance Rate, a standard term used in biometrics identification systems, 
meaning the probability of a person being falsely identified as another person than him- or 
herself. 
 
FRR: False Rejection Rate, a standard term used in biometrics identification context, 
meaning the probability of a person not being identified as him- or herself. 
 
PKI: Public Key Infrastructure is a system using public keys to verify that data is indeed from 
the entity it is supposed to be, and that the data has not been changed since it was issued. The 
data is encrypted using a secret, private key, and can only be decrypted using the 
corresponding public key. 
 
MRZ: The Machine-Readable Zone is the two lines on the bottom of the MRP data page. 
These lines can be read by machine and contains some of the same information as is written 
on the rest of the data page. 
 
1.1.7 Assumptions 
The main assumption in this study is that the information needed is available to us. The ICAO 
standard is publicly available, but costs approximately $ 250. However, this document 
contains three more or less separate parts, only one of which is directly linked to E-passports, 
named “Part 1 – Machine Readable Passports”. Other information, especially concerning 
governments’ implementations of the passports, might be more difficult to obtain. Most, if not 
all, of the information concerning ePassports is only available on the Internet, which means 
we must carefully select reliable sources. 
 
As the US is the initiator of the electronic passport policy, we believe it is likely that this 
country’s development may be more advanced and more thought through at present than most 
others. The first part of this assumption is supported by the article we use for our literature 
review [8, p 10]. We also think other governments may look to the US implementation of the 
ICAO standard, so their experiences could be the basis for other countries. Therefore we 
believe the US implementation is of such importance it would be smart to include it in our 
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work with sub problem 3 (“View the implementation of the ICAO standard by chosen 
governments in search for differences”). 
 
We also assume that, in the case of the electronic passports, many aspects of privacy and 
security intertwine. The electronic, and now biometric, passports are being implemented to 
improve the security of immigration worldwide [9]. The uses of digital data and automated 
procedures for biometric recognition of individuals are believed to increase security. The 
security of the passports themselves may have been improved, but there are other 
considerations. Several experts and organizations have voiced serious concerns about the 
privacy of biometric passport owners. Privacy concerns are not opposite of security concerns, 
but the two may interfere with each other, and privacy is often best protected using security 
mechanisms. Therefore, the privacy of passport owners is a major security concern, and will 
be treated as equally important in this paper.  
 
The last assumption is that we will actually be allowed to complete this project. The Head of 
Studies ICT, Stein Bergsmark, brought to our attention that we might need to make the 
Norwegian National Security Authority (the NSM) aware that we plan to perform a project 
concerning electronic passports. This, albeit doubtfully, might be deemed a threat to national 
security, and we should take this into account. 
 
To ensure the legality of our project, we sent a mail to the NSM explaining our project and 
requesting their approval if needed. The mail is situated in Annex A and was authored in 
cooperation with another group also producing a master thesis on ePassports. The NSM, 
however, did not respond to our request, so we assumed they did not have any objections. 
 
1.1.8 Initial Concerns 
We have, naturally, some initial concerns in this project. These are listed below. 
 
Several versions of the new passports have been presented, resulting in a general confusion 
over which name suits what version. Specifically, a passport with a machine-readable code on 
the data page is simply called a machine-readable passport; a passport with an incorporated 
datachip is known as an electronic passport; and if the chip contains biometric data about the 
owner, the passport is called biometric. For simplicity, the ICAO TAG/MRTD uses the term 
ePassport for biometric passports. It is our impression that many do not know of this 
distinction, and therefore, erroneously, add to the confusion. In this paper we will adhere to 
the TAG/MRTD terminology and use ‘ePassport’ to describe the electronic, biometric MRP. 
 
The group responsible for developing the ICAO standard, the TAG /MRTD, consists of 
experts from 13 (Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, India, Japan, New 
Zealand, Netherlands, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States) of 
ICAO’s 189 member states. 
 
“Delegations to the TAG/MRTD are normally composed of government experts dealing with 
travel control issues, which might include the passport authority, immigration authority, 
customs authority, and/or national police authorities. 
 
Observers are also invited to attend TAG/MRTD meetings. Observers can represent either 
States or non-governmental bodies such as the Airports Council International (ACI), the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA), the International Criminal Police 
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Organization (INTERPOL) and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).” 
The experts’ perspective is travel control. We wonder, are they capable to see all aspects? 
 
Our area of (some) expertise is Information- and Communications Technology (ICT). This 
area is only one part of the big picture, and should be regarded as such. To complete this 
paper satisfactorily, we also need to consider other aspects, especially privacy. 
 
1.1.9 Importance of our study 
The use of RFID chips in biometrical passports raises great concern in certain areas, 
especially those of security and privacy. In recent years, Gillette, Wal-Mart and other 
organizations have received much negative attention regarding their use of RFID chips to 
improve supply chain management and other tasks. These chips have made it possible to track 
and make statistics on the movement of consumers, breaking baseline privacy requirements of 
the civil population. The concern is that privacy and security may not be satisfactorily 
considered in the new passports. 
  
In addition, biometrics, although very intriguing, are still a relatively new way of computer-
based identifying of individuals. It is argued that software for biometrical identification is still 
quite inferior to humans [10]. This raises concern that it may be easier to spoof an automatic 
identification system than the old, manual one. 
  
Finally, the ICAO standard is only a guideline, and individual governments stand relatively 
free to implement whatever parts they wish, except the baseline standard, which, for 
compatibility reasons, must be implemented. Different types of implementations will 
necessarily have different security and privacy levels, which may in itself cause problems. In 
addition, three types of biometrics may be implemented, namely a photo of the passport’s 
owner, his/her fingerprint, and his/her iris scan. These are ranged increasingly by their rate of 
secure identification, but the required one, facial recognition, is the least secure one. Why 
choose this one when the other two are far superior regarding positive identification?  
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1.2 Theory and Literature 
This chapter starts with a presentation of the development of requirements for the US 
biometric passports over the year 2005. The year has been filled with public and 
organizational concern about the solutions for privacy and security in the new passports, 
followed by new requirements by the US state department. The second section of this chapter 
reviews the article “Security and Privacy issues in E-Passports” written by Dr. Ari Juels (at 
RSA Laboratories), David Molnar and David Wagner (both at the University of Colombia, 
Berkeley). 
 
1.2.1 Overview of 2005 and the issues of biometric passports 
As the United States of America publicly announced their plans about implementing 
biometric passports, there were almost immediate reactions from privacy organizations such 
as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) [5] and Privacilla [11], security experts [12] 
and civilians [13] and [14, p 61553]. Their concerns included the “big brother sees you”-
concept, and the security shortcomings of RFID chips contributing to the threat to privacy. 
We will concentrate on the ACLU statement, as it outlines the most central concerns of all 
these. 
  
The ACLU initially protested to the use of RFID chips, due to the security and privacy 
shortcomings of the RFID chips the government planned to implement. In April 2005, the 
ACLU sent a letter to the US State Department, expressing concerns, especially regarding the 
RFID technology [5b]. The reading distance of RFID chips in general, up to 30 feet (more 
than 9 metres), was especially addressed as a threat. At this time, the US department had not 
announced what RFID standard would be used. 
 
As the US chose not to encrypt the data on the chip, skimming, or unauthorized reading of the 
data on the RFID chip was made possible. This is more of a privacy attack than a security 
attack, but governments, who are responsible for protecting their citizens’ right to privacy, 
must also address privacy concerns. The ACLU points out that the ICAO standard calls for a 
type of RFID chips that cannot be read at long distances. 
 
The US government’s reasoning for skipping encryption was that the digital information is 
the same as the printed information on the passport. The ACLU disagrees, and points out the 
individual’s right to choose who will read the passport information, enabling them to protect 
themselves in some manner against unauthorized access to their personal information. 
 
The ACLU especially notes that unencrypted information would make it quite easy to 
remotely decide the nationality or other traits of a passport owner. This would make anyone 
able to detect and track individuals of given nationalities, for example providing terrorists 
with an easy way to attack citizens of certain nationalities. It is not difficult to find other, 
either dangerous or simply annoying, reasons for knowing the passport owner’s nationality, 
gender, age, even title, which is an optional field. As an example, many businesses would 
probably like to know these things about their foreign customers, to tailor their behaviour 
towards them. Identity theft is also mentioned as a possible result of skimming, also leading 
to passport forgery and fraud. 
 
Another means of the government was to use an anti-skimming material on the front and 
spine of the passport, a so-called ‘Faraday Cage’. This will protect the data while the passport 
is closed, but as soon as the passport is opened, there will be no protection of the 
communication between the RFID chip and the reader. Thus, listening the communication, or 
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eavesdropping, is possible. The government argued this would not be a problem, as 
eavesdropping equipment is large and difficult to place near ports of entry at airports or other 
borders stations. The ACLU argues that as time passes, the technology normally gets smaller, 
more powerful (and cheaper), and that eavesdropping can be successful at larger distances 
than normal communication. In addition, passports are not only used at border points of entry. 
Several hotels and cruise ships use passports to verify identity upon reservation. These 
environments may not be as well protected as airports or border stations. We will explain 
more about eavesdropping in the “Privacy and Security in E-passports” section of this 
chapter. 
 
This comment was, as previously mentioned, sent on 4 April 2005. At present, the concerns 
discussed in the letter have been more or less eliminated. This doesn’t make the document 
useless to our project, as it shows the initial weaknesses regarding privacy and security of the 
US biometric passports, and the public and organizational protests. The document sheds light 
on the need to address privacy and security issues, as many governments tend to choose the 
easiest and cheapest solutions, and it is difficult to take all aspects into consideration. 
  
Several adjustments had to be made to the US biometric passports. On 9 August 2005, the 
government presented new passport requirements, stating: ”The new passport will combine 
facial recognition and contactless chip technology. The chip, which will be embedded in the 
cover of the passport, will hold exactly the same information that is printed in the passport: 
name, date of birth, gender, place of birth, dates of passport issuance and expiration, 
passport number, and photo image of the bearer. A digital signature will protect the stored 
data from alteration and mitigate the threat of photo substitution.  
 
To address concerns that the chips may be susceptible to unauthorized reading (skimming in 
the industry parlance), the Department will incorporate anti-skimming technology in the front 
cover. The Department is also seriously considering incorporating basic access control 
(BAC) technology in the new passport. BAC prevents the chip from being accessed until the 
passport is opened and its machine-readable zone on the data page is read electronically. The 
anti-skimming feature and BAC, when taken together, will prevent unauthorized reading of 
the Electronic Passport.” [15] 
  
In this statement, many security issues directly important to the US government was 
improved. However, no encryption of the data was considered. Neither was the question 
whether the chip should be passive or active addressed, nor was the use of Basic Access 
Control determined. It would only be seriously considered. This solution was deemed 
unsatisfactory from a privacy perspective, as none of the concerns of the public were 
addressed. A new ruling had to be made. The final rule was made public on 25 October 2005, 
stating: ”Passports must be globally interoperable--that is, they must function the same way at 
every nation's border when they are presented. To that end, the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) has developed international specifications for electronic passports that 
will ensure their security and global interoperability. These specifications prescribe use of 
contactless smartcard chips and the format for data carried on the chips. They also specify 
the use of a form of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that will permit digital signatures to 
protect the data from tampering. The United States (U.S.) will follow these international 
specifications to ensure its electronic passport is globally interoperable (…) 
 
The ICAO specification for use of contactless chip technology requires a minimum capacity of 
32 kilobytes (KB). The U.S. has decided to use a 64KB chip to permit adequate storage room 
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in case additional data, or biometric indicators such as fingerprints or iris scans, are 
included in the future. Before modifying the definition of ``electronic passport'' to add a new 
or additional biometric identifier other than a digitized photograph, we will seek public 
comment through a new rule making process. 
 
The contactless smart chip that is being used in the electronic passport is a ``passive chip'' 
that derives its power from the reader that communicates with it. It cannot broadcast 
personal information because it does not have its own source of power. Readers that are on  
the open market, designed to read Type A or Type B contactless chips complying with 
International Standards Organization (ISO) 14443 and ISO 7816 specifications, will be able 
to communicate with the chip. This is necessary to permit nations to procure readers from a 
variety of vendors, facilitate global interoperability and ensure that the electronic passports 
are readable at all ports of entry. 
 
The proximity chip technology utilized in the electronic passport is designed to be read with 
chip readers at ports of entry only when the document is placed within inches of such readers. 
It uses RFID technology. The ISO 14443 RFID specification permits chips to be read when 
the electronic passport is placed within approximately ten centimeters of the reader. The 
reader provides the power to the chip and then an electronic communication between the chip 
and reader occurs via a transmission of radio waves. The technology is not the same as the 
vicinity chip RFID technology used for inventory tracking of items from distances at retail 
stores and warehouses. It will not permit ``tracking'' of individuals. It will only permit 
governmental authorities to know that an individual has arrived at a port of entry--which 
governmental authorities already know from presentation of non-electronic passports--with 
greater assurance that the person who presents the passport is the legitimate holder of the 
passport(…) 
 
Finally, the chip will contain coding to prevent any digital data from being altered or 
removed as well as the chip's unique ID number. This coding will be in the form of a high 
strength digital signature. The contents of the data page of the traditional passport have been 
established by international usage and by ICAO. The chip will not contain home addresses, 
social security numbers, or other information that might facilitate identity theft.” [14]. 
 
In summary, this rule states that the technology used for data storage and contactless 
communication is RFID, more specifically, RFID chips conforming to the ISO 14443 
standard mentioned earlier in this proposal. This means the chips will be passive and operate 
at 13.56 MHz. The intended read range is only about 10 cm at the present time. Basic Access 
Control will in fact be used to protect the data on the chip, but no encryption of the data will 
be done. The biometric will be re-evaluated at a later stage, meaning the US may be 
recognizing the inadequacies of facial recognition. 
 
Looking back at the privacy concerns of ACLU and others earlier this year, this is definitely a 
step in the right direction. As we will see in the next section, it is, however, not enough to 
completely secure the information. 
 
1.2.2 Security and Privacy issues in E-Passports [8] 
This article was published in September 2005, and is therefore reasonably recent in the field 
of E-passport issues. The ACLU has already addressed some of the issues listed in the article, 
and these we may review in less detail than new ones. The article starts by summing up 6 
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main threats to privacy and security. These are based on both the RFID technology and the 
biometrics that will be used. The 6 threats are: 
 
1 Clandestine Scanning, which can be accomplished from up to a few feet’s distance. This is 
a bigger threat to passports that only implement the baseline ICAO standard, and do not 
include encryption, BAC and/or a Faraday Cage, which are optional. 
 
2 Clandestine Tracking, made possible because each RFID chip must have an ID, which is 
emitted on protocol initiation, and used for link-layer collision avoidance. This ID, if unique 
for each passport, can be tracked. Even worse, information like nationality may be derived 
from it if the procedure for generating the ID makes this possible. 
 
3 Skimming and Cloning, clones of passports is a major security issue, as people who look 
alike could possibly use the same passport, even without changing the digital photograph. 
 
4 Eavesdropping, this is more problematic than scanning, as it is completely passive and 
therefore impossible to detect unless the actual device is discovered. It can also be achieved 
over greater distances than ordinary reading, especially if the eavesdropper has error-
correction procedures. Eavesdropping is, as the name indicates, listening to (and recording) 
the communication between RFID chip and reader. This way the information on the chip can 
be obtained without directly accessing it. It may be argued that it will be difficult to place 
eavesdropping equipment at ports of entry, but this is likely not to be the only place where 
electronic passports will be used. Hotels and cruise ships already use passports for confirming 
identity, and areas like e-commerce will also probably make use of the new passports. 
 
5 Biometric Data-Leakage, the need to keep biometric data secret is more and more 
important, as the process of authenticating the passports and their owners will be increasingly 
automated, and have less human oversight. 
 
6 Cryptographic Weaknesses, simply encrypting the data and/or communication of the 
RFID chip using any given encryption scheme is not enough. If the encryption or key(s) used 
do not withstand probable attacks, scanning the chip or eavesdropping on the communication 
will not be difficult. A false sense of security is in our opinion worse than knowing that you 
are vulnerable to attack. 
 
The first three points have been discussed in more or less detail in the media, while the latter 
three are more technically oriented, and might be better discussed in a more professional 
forum. The article provides an overview of these, with a review of parts of the ICAO 
standard’s chosen technologies, algorithms and procedures relating to security and privacy. 
  
The final rule of the US state department says that social security number, home address and 
“other information that facilitate identity theft” will not be included on the chip, the article, 
however, argues that the photograph, name and birth date, which will all be included, is a 
head start to successfully steal someone’s identity. 
   
Next, the article looks at the biometric threats, and, like the ACLU, concludes (against the US 
state department) that the increased automation and decreased manual oversight calls for 
biometric secrecy. In addition, the (optional) fingerprint image may be important for an 
individual to keep secret, as new technologies allow us to unlock our home, home computer 
or other items using fingerprints. This is also true for iris scans. The digital photograph of the 
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passport owner may not have these issues, but because the photo has such a good quality 
(lighting, perspective, background), it could actually spoof some face-recognition systems. 
  
The ICAO standard includes two optional, and one mandatory cryptographic feature for the 
passports. The mandatory one is Passive Authentication, meaning the information on the chip 
will be digitally signed by the issuing nation. The permitted signature algorithms include RSA, 
DSA and ECDSA. The fact that the signature only ensures that the data, not the chip 
(passport), is authentic is emphasized. 
  
The first optional feature is Basic Access Control (BAC) and Secure Messaging. The first part, 
BAC, initiates the other. A pair of cryptographic keys (KENC, KMAC) are stored on the RFID 
chip. When an attempt to read the information on the chip is detected, it starts a challenge-
response protocol that proves knowledge of KENC, KMAC, and a session key, which is used for 
Secure Messaging, is derived. The algorithm for this challenge-response protocol is outlined 
in [8, p 8]. 
 
KENC, KMAC must be possible to derive from the optically readable information on the 
passport, specifically the passport number, the date of birth of the bearer, the date of 
expiration of the passport and three check digits, one for each of the preceding values. This, 
according to the article’s authors, is too small at present. The ICAO PKI Technical Report 
says that the entropy is at most 56 bits, and that some of these bits may be guessable. The 
authors, after some logical reasoning over what the values of the information may be, claim 
that the entropy of the US passport may be even smaller, about 52 bits. Some other countries 
are even worse. The Dutch passport is reported to only have about 35 bits of entropy, which a 
laptop computer can break by brute force in a few hours. 
 
Another concern is that a single fixed key is used for the entire lifespan of a passport, 
meaning that there is no way to revoke access to the chip. The question is whether a person 
wishes any nation he or she has visited to have complete access to his or her personal data. 
  
The other optional feature, which the ICAO specification urges use of, is Active 
Authentication. This is an anti-cloning feature, meaning it is especially interesting in a 
governmental point of view. It relies on public-key cryptography, making the RFID chip 
prove its possession of a private key. The corresponding public key is stored with the signed 
data on the passport. In this procedure, the passport reader initiates a challenge-response 
protocol, in which the chip on the passport must respond correctly, or it fails the test. The 
algorithm for this protocol is outlined in [8, p 9]. 
  
The public key used in Active Authentication must, like the BAC keys, be tied to the 
passport, or more precisely, to the specific passport and the biometric data on it. If not, a man-
in-the middle attack is possible. The authors also emphasize the importance that the private 
key never leaves the passport (if it did, anyone could steal it and use it, meaning it would no 
longer be private). This is not explicitly stated in the ICAO standard. The authors also express 
some concern about the Active Authentication keys’ interaction with the BAC keys. In some 
cases, the keys might compromise each other. 
  
Three of the US government’s reasons for not including the cryptographic features in the 
passports are then listed and discussed. These are: (1) The data stored on the chip are identical 
to those printed in the passport; (2) Encrypted data would slow entry processing time; and (3) 
Encryption would impose more difficult technical coordination requirements among nations 
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implementing the e-passport system. Also, the Faraday Cage is expected to be sufficient 
protection of the information. 
  
The first reason has already been deemed flawed, both by this article and the ACLU 
comment. The second is a bit more difficult to discard immediately, but as both Active 
Authentication and BAC needs an optical scan of the passport (to obtain the keys), 
implementing one of them makes implementing the other in addition close to free. Some time 
will be spent performing the procedures, but this is not even mentioned in the article, so we 
expect it to be insignificant. It is probably in the size of seconds, maybe even less. The third 
reason is not even valid, as almost no coordination is necessary between the nations who 
implement the system. All information needed to derive keys is present on the passport, so the 
only coordination would be tied to which algorithms to use. This article does not find Faraday 
Cages to be sufficient protection of private information, because it provides no protection 
against eavesdropping, and electronic passports will probably be used in other areas than 
border security. The security at these locations cannot be standardized or enforced. Faraday 
Cages has therefore been deprecated in favor of BAC. It is, however, a good first line of 
defense. 
  
In order to strengthen the electronic passports, the article suggests making the keys for BAC 
larger. More specifically, 128 bits. Another means to make the passports more secure is to 
make the collision avoidance ID mentioned earlier dynamic. 
  
Finally, some future issues of E-passports are mentioned. One of these is the wish to include 
digital visas and “other endorsements”. Since two RFID chips close to each other could 
interfere with each other’s communication, all information would probably have to be placed 
on the same chip. This creates the need for writing new data on the chip after issuance, and 
the article suggests an area of append-only memory on the chip. This information might not 
be what the passport owner wants in his or her passport, as some countries denies entry to 
individuals who have visited certain other countries in the recent history. 
  
So-called function creep, meaning that the new passports could be used in different contexts 
than the intended one, causes another future issue. This will probably create problems we 
cannot even imagine at the present time. Data protection features can be undermined, as the 
bearer’s data will be spread over divergent systems. Users may also call for greater 
convenience as time passes. A widely accepted theory is that security measures and 
convenience do not mix well, so this may also cause problems. 
 
In our opinion, this article sums up most of the privacy and security concerns we have come 
across in our literature search. It certainly addresses some of the issues we intend to study in 
our project. Dr. Ari Juels is currently either the author or co-author of at least five other recent 
scientific research articles on RFID and privacy/security, so his work in this area is extensive. 
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1.3 The Gathering and Interpretation of Data 
This project is primarily a literature study, and contains both quantitative and qualitative 
properties. Literature studies are often qualitative in nature, but in order to arrive at our final 
conclusion, we probably also need to quantitatively analyze the ICAO standard and the 
security and privacy measures therein. A purely quantitative research method may however 
overlook important aspects. Governments consist of human beings, as does the general 
population. These groups decide how E-passports will be implemented and used, and 
quantitative methods may miss some of the nuances of human actions. It is important to grasp 
the big picture, and therefore a qualitative approach is just as necessary. All professional 
research and governmental publications must be assessed both in a qualitative and 
quantitative manner. 
 
To solve our first and second sub problems (“Determine the quality of the ICAO standard, 
and evaluate the technical and practical solutions presented in the document” and “Present 
and evaluate possible solutions to weaknesses we might find in the ICAO standard”), we need 
to study the ICAO standard. The first section of our project includes critical analysis of the 
quality of different technologies. 
 
The document is an essential part of both sub problem 1 and 2, and should probably be 
studied and analyzed quantitatively for the second sub problem, which is directly dependant 
on the first. It consists of solutions to what we have previously discovered.  
 
To solve our third sub problem (“View the implementation of the ICAO standard by chosen 
governments in search for differences”), we will need to search governmental statements 
focusing on what type of ePassport methods they will implement. It will probably be a good 
idea to make an overview of what features of the ICAO standard is to be implemented by 
which nations, and try to list as many of the nations possible in it. We have already seen a 
table doing just this in the article we have reviewed in the second part of chapter 3 [8, p 9]. 
This table is presented in Figure1. 
 
 
Figure 1 Table from ”Security and Privacy in E-Passports” 
 
The “Unknown” status of the ‘Security’ column for Australia and Belgium we have recently 
revised [16] and [17]. Both countries’ security methods include Passive and Active 
Authentication and BAC. Belgium also uses Diffie-Hellman based Extended Access Control, 
which prevents unauthorized access to or skimming of biometric data [18]. 
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The list enables us to determine what different governments emphasize in terms of security 
and privacy. Knowing what is important to governments in general makes our conclusion 
easier to reach, as the knowledge provides us with an initial measure of what is deemed 
‘secure enough’. 
 
The table we have copied may act as a model for comparison for the different information we 
obtain. We believe it could provide a good starting point for our analysis, but we will also 
need to use some qualitative research methods to provide a good overview of the complete e-
passport system in an international perspective. It is important for governments to see the “big 
picture”. 
 
In our dealings with sub problem 3, we encounter our first really qualitative method. We have 
chosen to go in-depth on two or three (The US, Norwegian and if information on the latter is 
scarce, or other countries’ implementation presents particularly interesting scenarios, other 
will be chosen from table in Figure 1) of the passport implementations, so-called case studies. 
The results of this part must however be presented more quantitatively to be useful to our 
fourth and final sub problem (“Sum our findings, and determine as best we can whether the 
new ePassports really are secure enough. Based on this, we can also try to recommend a 
minimum implementation that eliminates the most critical problems, if any.”). 
 
The fourth sub problem may prove to be the most difficult one. It is the summary of the other 
three, but also an attempt to take a step in the direction of more secure ePassports. The 
solution of this problem will only by reached by analyzing our results from other parts of the 
project. 
 
Some information has already been obtained, but we believe much of the first weeks will be 
spent in search of relevant information. This will be: Government publications, professional 
research in most areas of e-passports, professional research of the methods implemented by 
the ICAO standard (or other, non-standard methods), and other relevant, professional 
literature. This information is available both at the Internet, at the school library or by 
contacting the correct department. Some information may be confidential, or cost money, but 
if the availability of the information on the US passport is a good indicator, much will be 
possible to obtain. 
 
When the information has been secured, it will be necessary to write a qualitative review of it, 
focusing on and quantifying the information relevant for our sub problems. If we are to 
discover whether the different implementations create new security problems, we need to 
study other research. 
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2 RFID 
RFID (Radio Frequency IDentification) is traditionally a system for tracking products. The 
system has its root in the Second World War, were it was used to identify friendly aircrafts. 
The technology that was in use during the Second World War was named Identify Friend or 
Foe (IFF). After the war this technology was developed for new applications and used to track 
military equipment and personnel, RFID was born. In the late 1970s companies made an 
effort to commercialize RFID tracking technology, and during the last couple of decades 
RFID has become a well-known method. [19].  
 
 
Figure 2 RFID tag 
 
RFID is now a technology for automatic identification of objects, animals and people. RFID 
is a subset in the automatic identification (Auto-ID) class [20]. Auto-ID is a term for all 
automatic identification systems for commercial use, which includes barcodes, smart cards 
and optical recognition systems. RFID is the most important, discussed and well-known 
system of all automatic identification systems.  
 
An RFID chip, which may also be called an RFID tag, is a small microchip designed for 
wireless data transmission. This microchip is generally attached to an antenna in a small 
package. In ePassports this package is a part of the passport cover in the passport book [21]. 
There are two types of RFID tags, active and passive [19]. Active RFID tags have both an on-
tag power source and an active transmitter. Since they are connected to their own battery they 
have superior performance. Actually the read-range can be several kilometers. The passive 
RFID tag was invented in 1969 and patented in 1973 [20]. Passive tags have no power source 
and on-tag transmitter. That gives them a range of less than 10-meters, and also makes them 
sensitive to regulatory and environmental constraints. 
 
To make an RFID system work, every system consists of two integral parts: a tag and a 
reader. Readers interrogate RFID tags. When the RFID tag is passive the RFID reader 
transmits an energy field that powers the microchip in the tag, enabling it to transmit or store 
data. Active tags, however, may periodically transmit a signal so that multiple readers may 
capture data. 
 
During the last decays there has been constant development of new applications of RFID. 
Some of the most common uses for this technology are the following: 
• Proximity cards. Contactless cards used for building access. 
• Automated toll-payment transponders. Small plaques positioned on the inside of the 
windshield. 
• Theft-deterrent in ignition keys of many automobiles.  
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• Payment tokens. Examples are SpeedPass, American Express ExpressPay and 
Mastercard PayPass. 
• Pet control. Identification of pets are often done by an RFID chip. 
 
In the future we will probably see more use of RFID. Here are some of the possibilities: 
• Smart appliances. Like a refrigerator that warn you when you are low on some food or 
something has expired, or washing machines that select the wash cycles automatically. 
• Shopping. For example the system can automatically tally items, compute the total 
cost and charge the consumers’ RFID-enabled payment devices. 
• Interactive objects. A consumer can for example scan a movie poster to display show 
times on his/her mobile phone. 
• Medication compliance. An RFID-enabled medicine cabinet could help verify that 
medications are taken in a timely fashion. 
 
In ePassports RFID is used for two reasons; more or less automatic scanning of the passport 
and the possibility to add biometric features in the passport. The specifics of RFID chips used 
in biometric passports are addressed in the ISO 10536, 14443, 15693, 7816 and 10373 
standards [22]. The RFID chips used in the biometric passports are compliant with the ISO 
14443 standard, which specifies a radio frequency of 13.56 MHz; an intended read range of 
approximately 10 cm; and that the RFID chip may not contain an internal power source, 
which means it must derive power from the reader’s signal. This makes the biometric passport 
RFID chip passive, meaning it does not communicate at all until it is asked to. 
 
Every RFID system could be in danger of being attacked in some way or another. There are 
several threats for an RFID system. These can be both security and privacy threats. Passports 
include most of the personal information; therefore privacy is an important issue when it 
comes to ePassports. The STRIDE threat model is a model that can be used for analyzing 
most information systems, and this model is also valid for RFID systems [23]. STRIDE is an 
acronym for six threat categories. These are the following: 
1. Spoofing identity 
2. Tampering with data 
3. Repudiation 
4. Information disclosure 
5. Denial-of-service 
6. Elevation of privilege 
 
A relatively new threat for RFID is the ability to create viruses that can attack the RFID tag, 
or systems communicating with the tag.  
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3 Biometrics 
“Biometrics is the automated measurement of biological or behavioural features that identify 
a person” [4, p. 328]; or “Biometrics are the automated means of recognising a living person 
through the measurement of distinguishing physical or behavioural traits.” [24, p. 8]. 
 
In other words, using biometrics means collecting and using information about personal 
characteristics that uniquely identifies an individual. The different characteristics are usually 
divided into two categories, behavioural and physical. Techniques used for identification 
using behavioural characteristics include keystrokes dynamics, voice recognition and 
signature dynamics, while techniques using physical characteristics may be iris recognition, 
retina recognition, vein pattern recognition, face recognition, recognition of hand or finger 
geometry and fingerprint recognition [25]. 
  
All humans use biometrics, in particular facial features, voice characteristics and bodily 
characteristics, among others, to identify people they know. During the last century, 
techniques for using biometrics to legally, or officially, identify individuals have been 
developed, especially using fingerprints, dental features and DNA. Popular Science Fiction- 
and Action movies have for decades experimented with biometrics as means of secure 
identification (and often grotesque ways to beat this type of system), and been one of the 
motive powers in the development of biometrics techniques. 
 
The different types of unique features of the individual call for different techniques for 
sampling and treatment of biometrics data, and one type of biometrics can be treated in 
several different ways. For example, fingerprints can be treated as a complete picture, which 
is visually compared to another picture to locate similarities. 
 
Another way of treating fingerprints (or other biometric identifiers) is by computationally 
locating small details of interest in the pattern. Such characteristics are called minutiae, and 
may be bifurcations, ridge endings, deltas and the core [26]. The minutiae (their type and 
location) can then be given numerical values, which are sent through some algorithm to create 
a checksum, or a template representing the unique characteristics of this particular fingerprint. 
The different types of minutiae are presented in Figure 3 below, which we have copied from 
Carlsen’s presentation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 The minutiae of a fingerprint 
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Whenever the fingerprint pattern of the individual needs to be checked, the minutiae from his 
or her fingerprint will be sent through the same algorithm as the original sample. The new 
sample is compared to the stored template, and if the two have a satisfactory degree of 
similarity, the identity is confirmed. 
 
The first method is based on the standard method we humans use to recognise each other, and 
is best suited for human comparison. The second is a more mathematical approach, and is 
suited for automated identification. Computer systems may use this method much more 
effectively than humans. In general, computer assisted methods of identification based on 
biometrics use discrete values mathematically representing the biometric characteristics to 
create templates for a given person’s identity. 
 
In the ePassport context, both methods may be applied. The facial photo is stored in a 
compressed version, and the biometric data of fingerprint is stored as a template. The RFID 
chip has very limited data storage capacity. The ICAO TAG/MRTD standard demands at least 
32 KB storage capacity on the RFID chip [27], which, in theory, is enough to store 32 000 
letters in basic ASCII-code (each letter is represented using seven bits, the eighth bit of each 
byte is used for error-checking functions), or, put differently, about five times the text of this 
chapter, which contains almost 6 300 letters. This is without file allocation data, which is 
necessary if you wish to access the data again once it has been stored. 
 
This may sound like a lot of data, but pictures require much more storage space than 
characters. Specifically, the digital picture specified by the ICAO standard will without 
compression require almost 650 KB! Using JPEG and JPEG2000 compression the storage 
requirement might be reduced to only 12 KB, but more serious compression would, according 
to the ICAO, cause too unreliable facial recognition. The ICAO states that 15 – 20 KB will be 
the optimum storage size [24]. 
 
Mathematical representation of biometric data is not an exact science, only an approximation. 
[26]. The ICAO encourages all member states to research sampling- and recognition 
algorithms and individually decide on how accurate matching must be [24]. 
 
We will make a short presentation of the automated procedure for fingerprint recognition. A 
fingerprint generally contains about 100 minutiae, but the area scanned by sensors contains 
from 30 to 40. In European Courts, a fingerprint match is valid if at least 12 matching 
minutiae are found [25]. 
 
To extract a minutiae template from a fingerprint, several picture processing techniques need 
to be applied [26]. These include: 
• Image capturing (in greyscale) 
• Contrast enhancement / normalisation (spreading pixel values evenly along the 
black/white scale) 
• Contextual filtering (extrapolation of ridges, separation of nearby ridges and 
increasing contrast between ridges) 
• Binarisation (assignment of binary values to pixels, global median, local median) 
• Quality markup (removing surrounding “landscape” and bad image areas), and 
• Minutiae detection. 
 
The type and coordinates of the detected minutiae are stored as a template in the database 
containing other relevant data belonging to the owner. Whenever a new sample is taken, this 
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is compared to the stored template. According to manufacturers of fingerprint scanners, if the 
requirement is 8 matching minutiae, there is a false acceptance rate (FAR) of about 1 in a 
million. The FAR of course increases rapidly by requiring more matching minutiae. 
 
The procedure for face recognition is somewhat different in nature, and is based on human 
techniques for recognition, using a larger scale. Some of the unique identifiers in a face 
include the geometry of the face as a whole, distances and directional vectors between for 
example nose and chin, chin and cheekbones, the eyes and depth of the eye sockets [28]. The 
distance-procedure may also be used on the palm of the hand, or sole of the foot. The 
algorithms used for face recognition are constantly evolving and improving, as there is a 
considerable research effort being made in this area. 
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4 The ICAO Standard for ePassports 
The internationally applied standard for ePassports has been developed by the ICAO 
‘Technical Advisory Group on Machine Readable Travel Documents’, or the TAG/MRTD for 
short [1]. At present, this group consists of experts from 13 ICAO member countries, namely 
Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, India, Japan, New Zealand, the 
Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
 
In addition to regular members, observers, i.e. representatives from various countries and 
organizations, can also attend meetings of the TAG/MRTD. As examples of organizations, 
the ICAO MRTD website mentions the Airport Council International (ACI), the International 
Air Transport Association (IATA), the International Criminal Police Organization 
(INTERPOL) and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). Especially ISO 
has played and still plays an important role in the development process. 
 
The ICAO standard for Machine Readable Passports is outlined in a document called “Doc 
9303 Part 1 for Passports” [9]. Doc 9303 also consists of two other parts, namely “Part 2 for 
Visas” and “Part 3 for Official Travel Documents (cards)”. The latest version of part 1 of this 
document was published in 2003. At that time, no guidelines for RFID chips or biometrics 
existed, so technical reports describing use of these technologies have been issued at a later 
time. The latest supplement to Doc 9303 was published December 2005. This supplement 
gives an overview of which technology will be issued in the next release of Doc 9303, 
scheduled to be released within 2006. In the next release of “Doc 9303 Part 1” ICAO will 
have guidelines for ePassports. The new version will come in two volumes, and volume two 
will contain the specifications for an enhanced MRP with biometric data encoded in a 
contactless integrated circuit (RFID) chip.  
 
ICAO has also released a report called “Biometrics Deployment of Machine Readable 
Passports” [24]. This report includes the ICAO vision of biometric passport. The report is 
more an overview of other technical reports about the issue, than it is a technical overview 
itself. This report was issued in 2004, and technology and so forth have changed since that 
time. Some new thoughts are outlined in a fairly new report called “ICAO MRTD report” 
[31]. This report was released early 2006. 
 
There are at least three kinds of biometric data that are allowed stored in the RFID chip, and 
be used for identification of the passport holder. These are; fingerprint, iris scan (or retina 
scan) and facial recognition. More information about these features can be found in chapter 3.  
 
The ICAO standard provides some guidelines about how to secure the information stored at 
the RFID chip. A lot of this is presented below.  
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4.1 About the Ciphers Used in ePassport Security Measures 
[4,29,30] 
 
We recommend visiting Wikipedia online for more information about the mathematics 
involved in the ciphers. We have gathered most of the information in this section from this 
website. The basic algorithms for key generation are presented in Annex B, and are also 
gathered from Wikipedia. 
 
In general, Digital Signatures can ensure two things: That information indeed originated 
where it claims (the issuer signs the information encrypting it with his or her private key and 
it can then only be decrypted using the corresponding public key), or that information is only 
read by the correct recipient (the information is encrypted using the recipient’s public key, 
and can then only be decrypted by the one who possesses the corresponding private key. 
Digital Signatures are an integral part of ePassport Passive and Active Authentication, and 
algorithms that governments may use for Digital Signatures include: RSA, DSA and ECDSA. 
 
The RSA algorithm is from 1977, and is still going strong. The name consists of the initials of 
the three scientists at MIT who described it. The RSA cipher is the first one known to be 
suitable for digital signatures and encryption. It is an exponentiation cipher, meaning that it 
uses repeated multiplication. It is regarded as secure, as long as sufficiently long keys are 
used. The RSA uses two keys, one public and one private. 
 
The Digital Signatures Algorithm (DSA) is a US Federal Government standard for digital 
signatures. It was first proposed in 1991. DSA relies on the mathematical problem of solving 
the discrete logarithm problem. 
 
The Elliptic Curve DSA, or ECDSA, is a variation on the DSA, using elliptic curve groups 
(an elliptic curve is an algebraic curve defined by an equation on the form y2 = x3 + ax + b). 
Using elliptic curves provides smaller key sizes for the same security level, while execution 
time and signature size are roughly or exactly the same, respectively, as for DSA. 
 
RSA, DSA and ECDSA differ from one another in the mathematical techniques used for key 
generation, encryption and decryption and signature verification algorithms. 
 
For encryption of the messages used for the BAC protocol and Secure Messaging, the ICAO 
requires the use of two-key Triple DES in CBC mode. DES, or the Data Encryption standard, 
is the oldest of our ciphers. It was selected as an official Federal Information Processing 
Standard (FIPS) for the US in 1976. It has been frequently used, despite some suspicion of a 
NSA backdoor. The key used is only 56 bits of length. Today, basic DES is considered too 
insecure for many purposes because of the short key, but is improved to “believed to be 
practically secure” using the cipher three times, so-called Triple DES, or TDES. TDES 
generally uses three keys and enciphers the chosen information three times (EEE). Thus, the 
effective key length is tripled to 168 bits. 
 
The middle encryption may be replaced by decryption (EDE), for interoperability between 
TDES and DES. If the three keys were all equal, TDES with encryption-decryption-
encryption would in fact be the same as single DES. In the passports, two keys TDES is used, 
meaning that two of the three keys, namely number one and three, are alike. This makes the 
effective key length 112 bits, but because the mode is susceptible to certain chosen plaintext 
and known plaintext attacks, the official designated number of key bits is only 80. 
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DES, and TDES, is disappearing from use, replaced by Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES), which in essence is DES’ successor. It is much faster and offers markedly higher 
security margins, i.e. a larger block size, potentially longer keys and (as of 2005) freedom 
from cryptanalytic attacks. However, the use of two-key TDES is still favoured by the 
electronic payments industry and in hardware implementations. 
 
CBC mode, or Cipher Block Chaining, is a cipher technique used to prevent identical 
information to generate identical cipher texts. This may be used to break the cipher. CBC 
simply exclusive-ors any block with the preceding cipher text block before the block is 
encrypted. This method requires an initialization vector to be exclusive-or’ed with the initial 
plaintext block. The vector must be stored on the RFID chip along with the two keys and be 
treated as equally secret. 
 
The ICAO has issued recommendation for minimum key sizes, taking into account the ten-
year expected lifetime of the ePassports. The recommended key sizes are: 
• RSA:  
o Country Signing CA Keys:   modulus n 3072 bits 
o Document Signer Keys:   modulus n 2048 bits 
o Active Authentication Keys:  modulus n 1024 bits 
• DSA: 
o Country Signing CA Keys:   modulus p 3072 bits, modulus q 256 bits 
o Document Signer Keys:   modulus p 2048 bits, modulus q 224 bits 
o Active Authentication Keys:  modulus p 1024 bits, modulus q 160 bits 
• ECDSA: 
o Country Signing CA Keys:   base point order 256 bits 
o Document Signer Keys:   base point order 224 bits 
o Active Authentication Keys:   base point order 160 bits 
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5 National Implementation 
Our main focus is on the Norwegian and United States’ implementations of the ICAO 
standard. We list several reasons for this. First, the United States started work on their 
ePassports earlier than any other country (except Malaysia, but their passport does not follow 
the ICAO standard), so they have had several rounds with experts, the public and privacy 
organizations, especially the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Second, the US’ 
process of developing and issuing the passport has been highly open to the public, so we have 
been able to follow the discussion in retrospect. Our focus on the Norwegian implementation 
is based on the fact that as Norwegians we can get firsthand information from our 
government. Norway is also the third country in Europe to implement biometrics, and can in 
some degree be seen as pioneers in the context of ePassports. It is also easier for us to follow 
the development in Norway than in other countries since the press will cover every new 
aspect, we hope. 
 
The ICAO standard gives a guideline for which features nations can implement. There are few 
rules of what features must be implemented, and that results in many differences that an 
inspector has to be aware of. These differences could be in what kind of information to 
implement, and it could be differences in appearance and security features. More information 
about this is available in chapter 8. 
 
There are about 110 of the ICAO members that have issued Machine Readable Passports 
(MRP) and more than 40 countries are planning to upgrade to the biometrical enhanced 
version by the end of 2006 [31, p. 8]. All 189 ICAO members must issue only ICAO-standard 
MRPs within 1 April 2010, with or without biometrical enhancement. In Norway the MRP 
have been in use for some time now, at least since late 2004. Biometric passports with facial 
recognition have been issued in Norway since 3 October 2005, and from 2008/2009 they will 
also include fingerprints.  
 
Norway was the third country in Europe to implement biometrics in the passport. Sweden 
started implementing biometrics 1 October 2005 [32], and at the same time they started to 
issue eID (electronic IDentification) [32b] as an alternative to the usual passport for use in the 
so-called Schengen countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland and 
Spain). In other words, if the holders bring this identification card into these countries, they 
do not have to bring their passport. This identification card follows the ICAO standard as 
well. Both the ePassport and the identification card have a lifetime of five years in Sweden, 
while the ePassport have a lifetime of ten years in Norway. Denmark will start issuing 
ePassports from 1 August 2006 [33].  
 
Belgium was the first country to issue ePassports in the world [34]. In fact, Belgium received 
the 2003 Interpol award for the best and most secure passport in the world. Belgium has for 
several years used a national database containing personal information of all citizens, more or 
less eliminating identity theft, which was a large problem in the past. The issuing of Belgian 
passports is based on the information in this database. The database could only become a 
success because of the severe Belgian privacy legislation. Citizens trust their government and 
have full access to their own information online. The security of the database is very strict, 
and all queries for information are properly logged. The logs are also available to citizens 
whose information has been queried. 
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Belgium also has some of the most serious security mechanisms available implemented in 
their ePassports. In addition to the commonly implemented Passive Authentication and Basic 
Access Control, Belgian ePassports also implement Active Authentication, Extended Access 
Control and an active anti-skimming feature, meaning information can only be accessed if the 
holder permits it [17]. 
 
The ICAO standard allows for a high level of freedom in individual governments’ choice of 
security and privacy implementations. However, there are some areas where the ICAO 
chooses to recommend certain measures be taken. One of these is the effective lifetime of 
ePassports, and the ICAO provides several reasons for why five years should be the 
maximum lifetime [24, p. 47]. These are: 
 
• Chip technology is changing at a rapid rate and a shorter validity period enables more 
rapid takeup on new technology  
• Most Chip applications assume a chip/smartcard validity of 2-3 years – how such 
technology will perform over 5-10 years is yet to be tested in real world applications 
as the technology typically has not been deployed with consumers for that length of 
time  
• Biometrics technology is changing at a rapid rate, so a shorter validity period enables 
re-enrolment using more sophisticated technology  
• Most countries wish/need to turnover their passport booklet design every 5 years to 
keep ahead of counterfeiters  
• Security printing techniques are undergoing continual improvement, so it is desirable 
to turnover passport booklets more quickly  
• Security attacks on the data in the chip will become more sophisticated over time, so it 
is desirable to turnover passport booklets more quickly, enabling chip security 
protection mechanisms to be updated  
• Performance of biometrics can tend to decline over time (eg compare 10 year old 
photographs vs 5 year old photographs)  
• Turnover of passport applicants on a more regular basis allows rechecking of their 
bona-fides against new available databases eg online breeder document verification 
may have become available since the applicant originally applied  
• Child applications typically already have 5 years validity so such a change would 
bring adult validity in line with child validity  
 
Despite these recommendations, several governments, like the US and Norway, choose to 
keep the ten year validity. Others, like Sweden and Belgium have settled on a five-year 
lifetime. 
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6 Issuance 
Any security system is only as good as its weakest link. What procedures exist to ensure that 
the individual receiving the passport is indeed who he or she claims to be? 
 
The Norwegian system for issuing ePassports closely resembles the traditional issuing system. 
The applicant must present identification papers, like a birth certificate, driver’s licence or 
similarly accurate documentation. In addition, he or she must provide a passport photo no 
more than 6 months old of him- or herself. At present, a visual comparison is made of the 
photo and the applicant. The information is sent to the Finnish company Setec OY, which 
completes the ePassport and sends it to the recipient. The final distribution of the ePassport to 
its owner is made by conventional mail. 
 
The US system is somewhat different [35]. The first time a citizen applies for a passport, he 
or she must apply in person at a facility, which performs passport acceptance. These include 
Department of State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs, Office of Passport Services/Customer 
Service, i.e. several post offices, clerks of court, public libraries and other state, county, 
township and municipal government offices. The person must fill out the “Application for 
Passport, form DS-11”, present proof of US citizenship and proof of identity, provide two 
passport photos, a social security number and pay a fee. 
 
This part of the system is similar in nature to the Norwegian one. However, if a citizen wishes 
to renew his or her passport, and certain criteria are met, all that is needed is to fill out the 
“Application For Passport By Mail, form DS-82” and send it by mail in a padded envelope 
along with his or her most recent passport, two identical passport photos and a fee. 
 
The Norwegian Data Inspectorate, the body responsible for nationwide adherence to the 
Norwegian law of Personal Information is the institution that has directed the harshest critique 
against the ePassport in Norway. In some areas, the Norwegian Data Inspectorate is the 
Norwegian counterpart to the US’ American Civil Liberties Union (the ACLU). The ACLU 
however, is completely politically independent and has highly extended responsibilities 
compared to the Norwegian Data Inspectorate. The self-proclaimed responsibilities include 
protecting the individual’s freedom of speech, association and assembly; the right to equal 
protection under the law; the right to due process; and right to privacy [5c]. The final point of 
the ACLU’s tasks is the one corresponding to the tasks of the Norwegian Data Inspectorate. 
 
There are several security issues in the Norwegian issuance procedure, as noted by the 
Norwegian Data Inspectorate in their report dated March this year: 
 
15 November 2005, the Norwegian Data Inspectorate performed an inspection at the 
Norwegian National Police Directorate, which is responsible for issuing the ePassport. 16 
March 2006, the report following the inspection was published [36]. In the report, the 
Norwegian Data Inspectorate pointed out several weaknesses in the routines of the Police 
Directorate, and several demands were made to improve security and privacy. The deadline to 
meet the demands was set to 1 May 2006. 
 
The demands were (in short, freely translated and without paragraph references to the 
Norwegian law of Personal Information) as follows: 
• The Police Directorate must develop a written agreement about the treatment of data 
with the outside parties used to develop and issue the passports. 
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• The Police Directorate must perform necessary risk evaluations. 
• The Police Directorate must provide both applicant and holder of the ePassport with 
proper information about the applicant’s rights regarding acquiring knowledge about, 
correction and deletion of personal information.  
• The Police Directorate must provide both applicant and holder of the ePassport with 
proper information about how the personal information is treated at points of entry in 
Norway, and how the ePassports may be expected to be used at points of entry in other 
countries. 
• The Police Directorate must develop and implement a system for internal control. 
 
The ACLU has also had its share of critical comments to the ePassport. Among other things, 
the organization disclosed the fact that the RFID chips originally intended to be used had a 
reading distance of about 30 feet, or 9 metres. This was of course unacceptable, and new 
RFID chips had to be implemented. Additionally, the ACLU protested when the US 
government planned not to encrypt the digital information in the RFID chip, stating that this 
made it possible to create bombs that only explode when close to a US citizen. The protests 
from the ACLU have resulted in both the ICAO and the US government changing their 
implementation choices. 
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7 Other Use of the ePassport and its Components 
Passports are primarily used for immigration purposes, as identification of any person who 
wishes entry to a country other than his or her own. Other parties have, however, taken to use 
the passports themselves, both as a means of identification and to ensure payment or secure 
outstanding debits, often from foreign customers. These parties include hotels, cruise ships, 
Airplane check in and other, private parties. The practise is by now more or less commonly 
accepted, although many people dislike parting with their passport, especially in countries 
with a rather shady reputation. Despite of these reservations, some believe that the ePassport 
may become popular in e-business. 
 
Also, for Norwegians, the passport is the only accepted identity document outside of the 
Nordic region [37, art. 2]. This means anyone who requires identification from Norwegian 
citizens may demand to see the passport. In essence, any bar, pub or other establishment 
serving alcohol outside of the Nordic region would than have access to personal information, 
especially that of younger citizens. 
 
When ordering tickets for the UEFA Euro 2004 in Portugal, European citizens had to provide 
their name, date of birth, number of their passport or of the ID-card and date of passport issue 
into an Internet form [38, p. 10]. This information is exactly the one needed to derive the 
Basic Access Control key. This is a major cause for concern, because if the algorithm for 
deriving the key becomes public knowledge (distributed on the Internet by hackers), anyone 
succeeding in retrieving this information is able to read the information on the ePassports 
RFID tag. This procedure will also be used for certain concerts, the “2006 FIFA World Cup 
Germany“, the “UEFA Euro 2008” in Austria and Switzerland and the Olympic Games or 
other athletic world championships. 
 
Another field of application for fingerprints or other biometrics is as identification or 
authorization keys in personal appliances, or in private or governmental security systems. 
Some of the systems that already apply fingerprint identification are private computers, car 
ignitions and door locks, access to physically sealed-off security areas in corporate or 
governmental buildings and access to corporate or governmental data, for example in 
databases. Certain security systems also use fingerprints as part of the access key, in addition 
to for example passwords and smart cards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Fingerprint door lock 
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8 Control Procedures 
The ePassport has been developed partly with a goal in mind that the immigration control of 
travellers to some degree can be automated. Exactly how automated the process will be is 
difficult to predict at present, but it will probably be cheaper and faster than the traditional 
manual control, and therefore is highly desirable. 
 
Immigration control is the only point in the lifetime of the ePassport where it is guaranteed to 
be communicating with another entity, namely the passport reader. This communication has 
been subject to much discussion both in the media and by security and privacy experts. Early 
reports from experts told that expected communication range was about 10 metres. In other 
words, a hacker could be 10 metres from the passport with a reader and get the information 
from the tag. These reports have been to some degree silenced, as new RFID tag 
specifications have been implemented. At present, about 30 cm is the maximum expected 
possible reading range [36]. 
 
At present, passport control personnel have been required to know the characteristics of any 
country’s passport to successfully detect and stop frauds. The ICAO passport standard allows 
member states to choose much of their own passport designs, including security methods, 
given certain common specifications [9]. There are 189 member states, and each has a 
different implementation. Keeping track of all of the different passports, obviously, is not 
easy. A machine passport reader would probably do this job much easier and more accurate. 
 
There are already machine passport readers in use, but these only scan the machine-readable 
zone. With an RFID reader the inspector do not have to put the passport on a scanner, it will 
be sufficient to hold it a couple of centimetres from the reader. Even though the inspector will 
still scan the machine-readable zone (MRZ) to use this as a checkpoint against the RFID chip, 
it will to some degree be timesaving. This is because the inspector does not have to take every 
passport into closer look. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Automatic passport scan 
 
Several countries, and the EU, have signalled current and future use of both national and 
international databases containing personal information of all citizens holding ePassports. The 
personal information therein also includes biometric data; the same as the ePassport does. The 
database is then used to ensure the person holding the passport is indeed the individual he or 
she claims to be. A check against the database is made every time a person passes through 
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immigrations. In certain places, due to various reasons, the database may not be constantly 
updated. 
 
The US is very careful whom they let into the country after the terror attacks of 9/11. 
Everyone that enters the country have to tell exactly where he or she is going and how long he 
or she is going to stay. Travellers, at least those without biometric passport, must give 
fingerprints when they enter the States, and their picture is also taken. This information will 
be stored in the database the US already uses to check the passport holders travel history. 
Everybody that enters the United States is checked against this database, and if there are some 
irregularities the holder is questioned until the inspector is pleased with the answers. If the 
inspector is not pleased the traveller has to leave the country, or, in some extreme cases, they 
will be put in custody until the inspectors, or other security personnel, can get more 
information. 
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9 Discussion 
9.1 RFID and Biometric threats 
In this chapter we will present general security threats against RFID and biometrics.  
 
9.1.1 RFID Security Threats 
In chapter 2 we introduced the STRIDE model [23]. We will now use this model to analyze 
the possible problems that could occur with an RFID tag. 
 
1. Spoofing identity. Spoofing occurs when an attacker successfully poses as an 
authorized user of a system. In other words it occurs when an attacker impersonates 
other persons. In RFID that means that an attacker steals information from a tag and 
uses that information in another tag, or the attacker can use the original tag, to 
impersonate the original owner. Mostly spoofing is a term used about stealing an 
address or some kind of identifier. This information is then used in another tag to 
make it seem like the original one. The rest of the data does not have to be similar. 
2. Tampering with data. Occurs when an attacker modifies, adds, deletes, or reorders 
data. When a tag is modified, data is changed to let the tag look like a “good” tag. 
That could mean that the serial number (or other identifier) is reordered to look like 
another tag. Adding data is a way to achieve the same thing as with modifying, but 
here data is added instead of changing already existing data. Reordering data can be 
used to achieve exactly the same thing. 
3. Repudiation. Repudiation can be seen as denial by one of the involved parties in a 
communication of having participated in all or part of the communication. An 
example of this could be a reader in a system denying that it has received information 
from an RFID tag. 
4. Information disclosure. Occurs when information is exposed to an unauthorized user. 
This is a breach of privacy if the information is about an individual, as it is in 
passports. An attacker can use a reader to read the information on a tag that is nearby, 
or similar kind of attacks. 
5. Denial-of-service. Occurs when valid users are denied service. Mostly used to block 
readers from reading a tag. Can be used in an attempt to steal a product that is marked 
with an RFID tag. In passport control this can only be used to force manual control. 
6. Elevation of privilege. Occurs when an unprivileged user gains higher privilege than 
they were originally authorized for. Users can become attackers if they raise their 
status in the information system (database) connected to the reader in an RFID system. 
 
Not all of these threats are as dangerous to ePassports as it is if RFID is used for product 
tracking. When it comes to ePassports it is important that users’ privacy be protected, and that 
it is difficult to steal another person’s identity either by spoofing or by tampering with data on 
tags to pose as another person. It is unlikely that an attacker will try to just modify a chip or 
spoof identity, but we can imagine that it is more likely to combine these attacks. For 
example, an attacker can steal information from a tag (spoof) and modify another tag they 
possess to impersonate the original tag. The difficult part for an attacker is getting the 
information in the passport book to be similar to the information on the tag.  
 
Information disclosure is the most dangerous aspect of security around ePassports. In a world 
with widespread terrorism it is possible that terrorists or other criminals will try to kill people 
based on their citizenship. It is also more or less possible for governments to watch over 
potential terrorists if it is easy to read the information, even though this is not such a big new 
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threat, as governments already have ways to watch over people. In other words we can say 
that it is important that privacy is protected. 
 
As mentioned before, one of the new threats to RFID is computer viruses. A virus can be 
implemented on a RFID tag. This virus could be a member of three categories; buffer 
overflows, code insertion and SQL injection. When the reader gathers information from the 
tag, the virus will attack the software (the database or other) that the reader is connected to. 
The virus will then be implemented into other tags that communicate with that software, or 
the software will not function, as it should. These threats are not of a big concern when it 
comes to the ePassport itself, but can in some way be involved with the control procedure. 
This is based on the assumption that it is possible to add or change data on the RFID chip 
after it is implemented in the passport. The chip is write-secured when it is implemented in 
the passport, as this is one of the security features, but we do not know what will be the case 
later, if digital visas are to be implemented as indicated. 
 
9.1.2 Biometric Security Threats 
It is possible to fool a face scanner simply using a picture instead of a real face. This is 
mentioned in [8], the main report we used for our initial literature review. Of course, if a 
guard is present and ensures the actual face is scanned, this should be prevented. High quality 
facemasks might be a more difficult matter, but demands rather good access to the face one 
wishes to copy. As the face does not contain very many, highly unique characteristics, the 
face recognition systems actually have an error rate of 5-40% already [10], making them 
insecure enough without active attempts of fraud. 
 
A larger fraud problem appears when using fingerprints. It is actually quite easy to produce 
false fingers or fingerprints on films that can be attached to the finger [26]. Taking copies of 
fingerprints is only slightly more difficult without the cooperation of the owner of the finger 
than with cooperation. One only needs the fingerprint on a smooth surface, like glass or metal, 
or the finger itself, which we find a more inhumane way, although tough criminals probably 
find it quite convenient. This attack is actually difficult to detect even when guards supervise 
the process in its entirety. Also, it is statistically possible, yet less likely than with facial 
recognition, to be identified as another person due to the somewhat restricted number of 
minutiae used. The use of pulse detection might counter the use of false fingers, but might not 
detect the use of fingerprints on films. 
 
We would believe that iris scans, which are regarded as the most secure biometric, may be 
vulnerable to similar attacks as the fingerprints, using contact lenses with the desired patterns. 
Some may claim the tendency conventional lenses have to move around the horizontal axis 
changing the position of the pattern will make this difficult, but this problem is already solved 
by the contact lens industry itself, making the “bottom” of the lens heavier than the top. This 
technique is already quite successful in contact lenses using certain patterns like cat eyes and 
“smileys”. To acquire the pattern however, one must have access to the eyes of the individual 
the attacker attempts to impersonate, either at close enough range to take a photo of the iris, or 
by removing the eye itself, grotesque as it may be. 
 
The use of biometrics is not as free from problems as one might think at first glance. Facial 
recognition is made difficult when a face is disfigured by some accident. Fingerprints cannot 
be taken from people who do not have fingers, and iris scans are useless if the eye has been 
injured or infected with certain eye diseases making the cornea opaque, destroying the 
patterns of the iris or in other ways preventing iris scans. How individuals with these 
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challenges are to be identified may in fact be a security problem. Suppose a criminal burns of 
his or her fingerprints to avoid the identification process, how can this be counteracted? 
 
On the other hand, fingerprints may disclose information that is highly private, and protected 
by privacy legislations. According to some research, various papillary patterns may have 
correlation with some diseases [38]. It is said that certain papillary patterns are dependant of 
the nutrition of the mother in the third month of the pregnancy, and leukaemia and breast 
cancer might be statistically correlated to others. 
 
We will not discuss whether it is likely that certain papillary patterns are correlated to certain 
diseases, we simply state that we do not believe it impossible. Both may be influenced by 
genetics, and as some genes are correlated to others, the scenario probably needs serious 
research. If this is indeed the case, this is definitely very private information and should be 
particularly rigorously protected. The information would probably be very interesting to 
insurance companies and potential employers, but should be kept private. 
 
9.2 Discussion of The ICAO Standard for ePassports 
Development of the standard has become a lengthy process. Doc 9303 is a relatively large 
document with many different aspects to consider. It is important that the ICAO standard is a 
standard that all members can follow, and therefore everything has to be thoroughly revised 
and reconsidered. The fact that Part 1 of the standard has not been updated in a full scale since 
2003 interprets that the work is thorough. The TAG/MRTD has had conferences to work 
through some of the problems. They have also had a good exchange of updated or commented 
supplements to Doc 9303 among the members of the group. We believe that this kind of 
cooperation will give a good result, as we will probably see in the new version of the 
document. 
 
The ICAO standard is just a guideline for what features that could or should be implemented. 
There are few required features. This results in very different choices in different countries. 
We find the standard a bit poor in the sense of being just a guideline not a set standard the 
members have to follow. It will be better with electronic control than manual, but this can still 
create some problems. More about this issue will be discussed in chapter 9.6. 
 
The current issue of Doc 9303 Part 1 contains extremely little about digital security. Mostly it 
is security related to the issuance of the passport and the layout of the pages. Security must be 
a larger part of the new standard, as integrated circuit cards and biometrics are implemented 
in the passport. Security aspects must now consist of methods against attacks against the 
RFID tag when the passport is in an immigrant’s pocket, or when it is presented to the reader. 
Layout of the pages has to be an issue even though the RFID part of the passport is the most 
important aspect. The reason for this is that there are several countries that are not a part of 
the ICAO, and therefore they don’t have the same security methods, and possibly no RFID 
implemented.  
 
9.3 Discussion of National Implementation 
Since there are many different security methods that possibly can be implemented in national 
passports, there are many problems a nation may face. The problems can be with the passport, 
with the reader or with the software the reader is connected to. Problems with the passport can 
be; issuance, activation of the RFID chip, encryption and other security methods on the chip, 
or it can be to figure out which information that should be stored at the chip. Problems with 
the RFID reader could be; long scanning-time, difficulty to use, wear and tear on both reader 
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and passports, and stability problems. The software has to contain a database, and therefore 
there could be security problems connected to this. Especially if the database is a central base 
which clients have online connection with.  
 
If we look closer at the databases to be used for identity check, there are at least as many 
threats to this as any other database connected to some kind of network. Encrypted direct lines 
between the clients and the database will keep some of the threats at a pleasant distance, but 
there are still other things to consider. It is highly important that this database is protected 
against hackers, because the database will contain highly sensitive information. Information 
can be things like name, address, personal number, criminal records, where the holder has 
been, and where the holder is going to travel. An international database is not a national 
implementation problem, but the security of the clients connected to the database is. Every 
time a passport is read the clients makes a query and sends this to the database. If an attacker 
can hack into the client he can send queries, or he can read the information that is a part of the 
query. This information could be sufficient to get the information the attacker wants. 
 
A lot of the countries have implemented a database of their own. Indeed many countries will 
probably choose to only use their own database until an international database of sufficient 
quality is presented, which will probably not happen until most of the countries have the same 
biometric implementations. One of the most well known databases is the American one. This 
database is mentioned in chapter 8. The database used in America has information about the 
holder, including biometrics, and the holders’ travel history. It will also have some 
information about criminal records. When a national database, like the American one, is 
implemented, the security aspects of clients in the network are as important as if it was 
internationally implemented. The American national database must also be a security issue for 
the American government, and security methods have to be implemented for the database 
itself. 
 
Also, the different implementations of national and international databases create a security 
problem for those choosing not to use a database for verification of immigrants and passports. 
The fact is that a fake ePassport is less likely to be detected in a passport control situation, as 
it will not be compared to the records of any database. Hence, organized criminals like the 
mafia would probably prefer to falsify passports from countries using neither a national nor 
international database. 
 
Readers are another implementation issue. How the reader works and which design it has is 
not a government issue. The government has to buy this from a manufacturer they find 
trustworthy, and that delivers user-friendly, fast and reliable readers. The most important 
thing about the reader is that it is reliable. 
 
The most important implementation issue the countries are faced with is the implementation 
of the passport itself. If RFID is implemented, all the other aspects mentioned about the 
database and the reader must be considered, if not, countries do not have to take this so much 
under consideration. Many countries will probably implement a database even though they 
only have machine-readable passports. 
 
The issuance and some security aspects of the passport is presented in chapter 6 and discussed 
in chapter 9.4. The other aspects of the passport implementation we will discuss in some 
degree here. 
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The ICAO has not set a date for implementation of RFID. All member-states have to 
implement the machine-readable zone by 2010. Even though the ICAO have not argued that 
all members have to implement RFID and biometrics, it is more secure so the ICAO will most 
likely urge implementation to commence as soon as possible. More than 40 countries have 
given notice that they will implement it by the end of 2006. We believe that with this 
frequency of countries implementing RFID and biometrics in their passport, most of the 
ICAO member-states will probably have these features in their passports by 2010, not only 
machine-readable zone. In Scandinavia all countries will have the ePassport in use from 1 
August 2006. 
 
The reason several governments have chosen to keep the ten-year lifetime for passports, is, 
we believe, economics. A Norwegian passport now costs NOK 990, and a US passport costs 
USD 97. The governments probably fear that citizens will protest if faced with such fees 
every five years or so. To some degree, we understand this, and it will probably also cost the 
governments increased sums if shorter lifetime results in more development. However, there 
are very serious security and privacy risks, not to mention technology performance issues, in 
pursuing a ten-year lifetime, as we have described in chapter 5. 
 
9.4 Discussion of Issuance 
A good place to start this part of our discussion is by focusing on the five demands from the 
Norwegian Data Inspectorate to the Norwegian Police Directorate. In our opinion, all 
governments issuing not only ePassports, but also passports in general should seriously 
consider these. 
 
The first demand was: “The Police Directorate must develop a written agreement about the 
treatment of data with the outside parties used to develop and issue the passports.” In the 
report, Setec OY was especially mentioned, as the company as far as we understand inserts 
personal information into the passport both physically and electronically. The Digital 
Signature key used for Passive Authentication is supposed to authenticate the issuing 
government, but in reality, is it actually used by Setec? In [36, p. 7] the Data Inspectorate 
states that during the inspection, the Police Directorate informed that the electronic contents 
of the ePassport was secured with a so-called “root key”, and that this key is in the possession 
of the Police Directorate. 
 
The “root key”, we assume, is another name for the digital signature key, which is a private 
key in a PKI. If so, the Police Directorate is responsible for the correct use of the key. At the 
police information webpage for ePassports [37, art.1] it is informed that all personal 
information is sent electronically to the Norwegian Setec subsidiary in Oslo, which in turn 
engraves it in the ePassport and then sends the ePassport by ordinary mail to the recipient. 
This means that Setec also must be in possession of the key, and using it. As we have not 
been able to obtain the written agreement between the Police Directorate and Setec, we do not 
know what rules exist for how Setec must treat this extremely sensitive piece of information, 
but we of course share the concern of the Data Inspectorate over the shortcomings of the 
written agreement. 
 
Setec will also treat all personal information of ePassport applicants, in all three Scandinavian 
countries. This probably makes it a very interesting target for individuals with malicious 
intents. To some extent, using decentralized subsidiaries in each country in which Setec is 
responsible for developing and personalizing ePassports probably counteracts this threat. We 
believe this is one of the key motivations for Setec to establish daughter companies in 
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Norway, Sweden and Denmark. The other reason for decentralized personalization of the 
ePassports is of course that it is easier and probably cheaper to perform this task in the 
respective countries. We would not be surprised if the governments actually require that 
ePassport personalization be done in the respective country due to security and privacy 
considerations. 
 
Also, we do not know what security routines Setec OY employs. With our best efforts, we 
cannot find that the Setec website contains very available information about company internal 
security. Of course, we believe that this more than hundred-year old company has very good 
routines. However, any company is in essence no more than a group of people and their 
collective resources. We are certain that company culture and formal procedures are highly 
security-conscious, but no system is completely foolproof. To believe anything else is naïve 
and very dangerous. Our concern is that individuals with malicious intents might gain access 
to sensitive information. We find it necessary to emphasize that we do not suspect Setec OY 
of inadequate security measures, the company has long traditions in the security printing 
business, and the list of partners and customers is both long and impressive. We simply state 
that any company might become compromised, and this should be kept in mind. 
 
The second demand from the Data Inspectorate was: “The Police Directorate must perform 
necessary risk evaluations”. According to the Data Inspectorate, several areas of the issuance 
process need risk evaluations, which are used to discover security threats and security levels. 
The Norwegian law of personal information, which demands systematic efforts to achieve 
proper protection of personal information, supports this demand. By September 2005, The 
Police Directorate had not performed any risk evaluations. 
 
In general, the Data Inspectorate expressed concern that the information security choices are 
based on several documents, both official [9] and unofficial [24,27,30,39,40,41], from the 
ICAO. The Data Inspectorate feels there is some confusion because some of the ICAO 
security measures are required while others are recommended, and that the final decisions 
regarding which to incorporate are unclear. 
 
We found certain parts of the Data Inspectorate report unsettling. Some of the statements 
made by officials did not completely coincide with views made by experts, or did not express 
enough concern for relatively well-known risks. This was especially the case when discussing 
the Basic Access Control and expected lifetime of the ePassports. We chose to question the 
Data Inspectorate about certain of their statements. The e-mail we sent to the Data 
Inspectorate and their response is presented in Annex C. 
 
We asked about whether they really regarded BAC to be secure enough, as they seemed to 
accept as a fact in the report. We also asked why they seemed to mean that a visual inspection 
of the photos to be used against the applicant was poorer than using biometric identification 
algorithm on a computer. Earlier in this paper we have cited UK experts who claim machines 
are potentially even poorer at recognising faces than humans. Finally, we asked them to 
outline what a risk evaluation is supposed to produce in terms of solutions. The answers to 
these questions will be presented where appropriate. 
 
We did discover one fact about the Norwegian Data Inspectorate. They do not approve or 
disapprove methods to be used for securing ePassports. This is the responsibility of the Police 
Directorate. The only means the Data Inspectorate has at its disposal to point out poor choices 
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is demanding risk evaluations. We believe the Data Inspectorate demands risk evaluations to 
force the Police Directorate to discover when a method is not sufficiently secure. 
 
The Different areas and methods that need to be risk evaluated are discussed in the 15 
following paragraphs. 
 
First, the issuance procedure of sending the ePassports by conventional mail is mentioned. 
There is no way to ensure the correct recipient receives the new ePassport. It is also possible 
to intercept the passport by taking it from the mailbox, keep it for some time and then put it 
back. This method is, we realise, quite cumbersome, and the main problem is how to know 
who has applied for a passport, and when it will arrive. Observing police station activities, 
and perhaps stealing the wallets of applicants to determine their identities might achieve this. 
The method is unlikely, but probably not impossible, and we also believe organized criminals 
have more experience devising creative plans to steal passports than us. 
 
The Police Directorate argues that sending them by registered mail would cost NOK 19-20 
million per year [37], so this according to them is out of the question. Another solution might 
be the passport applicant having to personally retrieve the ePassport at his or her respective 
passport issuance facility, i.e. the police station. Alternatively, the postal office could be used 
for this, but we do not know at what cost. 
 
Secondly, the Data Inspectorate demanded risk evaluation to be performed on the lifetime 
validity of the ePassports. At present, the effective lifetime is set to 10 years, just as for the 
old passports. This, we believe may be of serious concern. It is not extensively debated in the 
report, but in our opinion, it is dangerous to guarantee a relatively new technology using 
cryptography to be sufficiently secure for such a long time. 
 
In this concern, the popular Moore’s law plays an important role. It states that the complexity 
of integrated circuits, with respect to minimum component costs, doubles every 24 months 
[29]. This means that, put very simply, every two years computers double their strength and 
calculation capacity. It was stated in 1975, and has been predicted to fail several times during 
the years, but has in general held the test. Moore’s law is an empirical observation used as a 
prediction, and as such it may very well be a self-fulfilling prophecy. In any case, the fact that 
computing capacity increases at such a rapid rate, gives us some concerns. 
 
For starters, the RFID chip is one such integrated circuit. If it is to follow the rapid evolution 
Moore’s law predicts, it might be clever to wait only a few more years until the chip storage 
space is somewhat larger and can include heavyweight security measures, at no or little added 
financial cost. But the fact that computers used for cracking encryption codes also evolve is 
more sinister in nature. This means that in ten years time crackers might with some effort be 
able to break the security of the ePassports. 
 
Another concern regarding the long lifetime of the ePassports is in the fact that encryption 
algorithms face serious attacks from both scientists and hackers/crackers. The goal of the 
former is to attempt to prove or disprove the security level of the algorithm, and the goal of 
the latter is well known. Several so-called secure algorithms have met their demise during the 
years, toppled over by some unknown mistake. We fear that in time some security algorithm 
of the ePassport might face this fate. 
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The different security measures using ciphers that are used by the ePassport RFID chip are: 
Passive and Active Authentication and Basic Access Control, BAC. Passive and Active 
Authentication use one of the ciphers RSA, DSA or ECDSA for Digital Signatures. BAC uses 
two-key triple-DES in CBS mode. We will in short present the security level they at present 
hold. RSA and DSA are widely used ciphers, and are regarded as secure if the keys used are 
sufficiently long. ECDSA is a variant of DSA, producing smaller key sizes for the same 
security level, while execution time is roughly the same and signature size is unchanged. 
 
The ciphers are all using one private and one public key, which some attack types might be 
able to break. Breaking a cipher may however mean two things: obtaining the message itself 
or achieving the secret key for enciphering and/or deciphering. Primarily, we consider the 
situation where an attacker uses eavesdropping equipment to intercept the communication 
between a passport and a legitimate reader. 
 
The first possible attack against a public key system is a “Forward Search”, or 
precomputation [42]. A Forward Search attack exploits limited input message entropy, when 
using the public key to encipher information only intended for the secret key holder. This 
requires that the attacker actually possesses the public key. As it is not a secret, the public key 
might be available at present or at a later time. Forward Search however, does not result in 
achieving the private key. It simply provides a possibility to discover the original message 
through comparing the cipher text to already enciphered possible messages (hence the need 
for a limited input message entropy). Active Authentication also includes random padding 
data, probably intended to counteract this attack [8]. 
 
DES is clearly the weakest cipher of the group. In its original form it is possible to break in 
less than 24 hours [29]. However, the version used in the ePassports is much more complex. It 
uses two keys and three subsequent encryptions (or encryption-decryption-encryption), 
making the encryption much more secure than single DES. However, two-key Triple DES is 
vulnerable to certain “Chosen Plaintext” or “Known Plaintext” attacks, which in worst case 
could reveal the secret key. Both attacks require the public key to be known, and we do not at 
present know how easy it will be to achieve it. In addition, the encryption is in CBC mode, 
meaning that the previous cipher text block is used to scramble the next plain text block. To 
counter this, an attacker would need to know the initiation vector, which is stored along with 
the keys. 
 
We find it quite clear that given enough time, these attacks are much more feasible. The 
scenario of a hotel or cruise ship holding the passport for the entire stay of a tourist is a much 
more likely attack situation. The entropy of some of the messages between the passport and a 
reader is not very large, so forward search, chosen plaintext or known plaintext attacks may 
succeed now or later, especially given the evolution of the hardware needed to perform the 
calculations. 
 
The third area the Data Inspectorate demands to be risk evaluated is the BAC itself. The 
Police Directorate claimed BAC to be sufficiently secure, but the Inspectorate still demanded 
risk evaluations. At this point, we discovered what the Data Inspectorate really meant about 
the use of BAC. According to Atle Årnes, a senior engineer at the Data Inspectorate, BAC is 
not a good algorithm, and the main problem is that the information to derive the keys is not a 
secret. It is contained in the machine-readable zone, and is among other things used for 
ordering tickets for large happenings like international sports arrangements and concerts. The 
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Data Inspectorate hoped the Police Directorate might also realise this through a risk 
evaluation. 
 
The fourth area requiring risk evaluation was the reading distance of the RFID chip. At 
present, the distance is about 10 cm when using BAC. Without BAC, the distance might be 30 
cm. As the RFID chip is passive, its transmission power is limited. However, simple 
eavesdropping on the communication is already possible from much larger distances. The 
limiting part is the error-correction equipment, which may very well experience considerable 
development during the next 10 years. It is necessary to note that using a Faraday Cage 
prohibits communication except when the passport is open. However, nobody has any control 
over what future situations that may require the passport to be open, so in our opinion this is 
actually only a way of making it a bit more difficult to gain access to the information. 
 
The final area in which risk evaluation had to be performed was the gathering of data from the 
applicant. The two pictures to be provided by the applicant was the most serious concern. 
There is no guarantee that the pictures actually are of the correct individual, and at present, 
only a visual inspection of the photo is made. The Data Inspectorate argues that in Sweden, 
the applicant has to take the pictures at the police station, ensuring the validity of the picture. 
The Police Directorate states that this is too expensive, and not feasible. The Data 
Inspectorate, as we mentioned earlier, questioned the visual inspection, because, again 
according to Atle Årnes, only a machine can compare biometrical data with biometrical data. 
We tend to agree, as only a machine “sees” well enough to count pixels between the eyes, for 
example. 
 
At some later stage, the Police Directorate will probably implement the same method for 
biometrics identification as immigrations control, and then, supplemented by visual 
inspection, the identification will probably be “good enough”. 
 
The third demand from the Data Inspectorate was “The Police Directorate must provide both 
applicant and holder of the ePassport with proper information about the applicant’s rights 
regarding acquiring knowledge about, correction and deletion of personal information.” The 
law of personal information demands any citizen be given the opportunity to view and correct 
any personal information gathered about them. This also applies to the information contained 
in the RFID chip of their personal ePassport. However, this can only be accessed through 
special readers, and at the time the report was written, the only readers in Norway were in the 
possession of Setec and “Politiets Data- og Materielltjeneste”, PDMT (directly translated the 
“police’s data- and materiel service”), and not available to the public. This was not 
acceptable, and now, readers are available at all police districts. 
 
The fourth demand from the Data Inspectorate was: “The Police Directorate must provide 
both applicant and holder of the ePassport with proper information about how the personal 
information is treated at points of entry in Norway, and how the ePassports may be expected 
to be used at points of entry in other countries.” When the report was written, very little – and 
even self-contradictory information was available to citizens about the information contained 
in the ePassport and what security measures were used. The Data Inspectorate required this 
information to be available on the police website. Since the report was published, this has 
been improved greatly, but we still claim the Norwegian Police Directorate should have 
studied the websites of our Scandinavian counterparts Sweden and Denmark, and learned 
much about informing the citizens. 
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The final demand was: “The Police Directorate must develop and implement a system for 
internal control.” At the time of the inspection, the Police Directorate admitted to lacking 
internal routines, and we can present two local examples of this. First, the grandmother of one 
of us actually received her last passport with the last name of another woman written in it. 
The explanation was that the mother of the officer writing down her information had the same 
first name as her, and therefore automatically wrote his mother’s last name.  
 
Second, and more serious, at 7 May 2006 the local newspaper Agderposten [43] wrote an 
article about a man who received his new ePassport with the picture of a completely unknown 
man. He found this quite odd, as he had himself witnessed the officer attaching the correct 
photos to the application form. 
 
Several good practice advices exist, and one of the most important is the principle of 
Separation of Duties [4, p. 152]. In short, this principle states that if two or more steps are 
needed to perform a critical task, then at least two different people should perform it. This 
principle is closely related to the fact that redundancy is a way to detect and prevent errors 
like the two we presented above. Redundancy is accomplished by letting another person 
check that the information recorded is indeed correct. 
 
Another possibly useful principle is the one of Economy of mechanism [4, p. 344], stating 
that security mechanisms should be as simple as possible. The principle is easy to project to 
any type of mechanism, and is correlated to the KISS (Keep It Simple, Stupid) principle. It is 
well known that simple procedures result in fewer errors. At the very least, the Belgian 
passport issuance procedure should be studied, as this country seems to be regarded as one of 
the best in security and privacy issues. 
 
Any government issuing ePassport should seriously consider these concerns. However, other 
governments use even less secure procedures for issuance. US citizens meeting certain criteria 
may actually apply for new passports by conventional mail. This means no check is made to 
ensure the photos are correct, nor that the person actually has requested a new passport. We 
find this very disturbing, for obvious reasons. 
 
9.5 Discussion of Other Use of the ePassport and its Components 
As we have already noted, it is by now more or less commonly accepted that foreign hotels 
and cruise ships require the possession of their visitors’ passports, either for some time or for 
the entire stay. This is to ensure payment, but also provides the hotel or cruise ship owners 
and employees access to private information. While eavesdropping on legitimate 
communication between passport chip and reader, which is a commonly mentioned and 
dreaded hacker attack, faces the difficulties of having to be performed on real-time 
information flow, an attacker having access to passports in this scenario could have a full 
week or longer to complete his or her attack. 
 
As most people already know, many young people do not worry much about anything, 
especially when partying on vacation in another country. It is not difficult to believe that they 
would gladly present their passport if required upon entering a bar. Often, adults are more 
careful, but might also be persuaded. Suppose the bar then offers to take care of the passports 
for their customers, maybe in “safe” deposit boxes. This would provide the owners with 
complete access to the passports for a night, given that they simply possess a spare key and 
keeps an eye out for when the passport’s owner wishes to leave. 
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Facial recognition was originally adopted as primary biometric identifier in the ePassport 
largely because the face is the biometric most citizens already display in public. As previously 
mentioned, the facial features is what most humans use to identify other individuals, and is 
also the preferred biometric used in most ID documents. However, many of the ICAO 
member states (the US and EU for instance) either already, or will at a later stage, demand the 
use of additional biometrics identifiers, particularly fingerprints. 
 
The use of fingerprints in ePassports might be problematic in regard to other areas of 
applications for fingerprints. Concern has been voiced that citizens may not wish to provide 
their fingerprint as a second biometric, because they know the police use fingerprints when 
identifying and processing criminals. One obvious area where fingerprints are used for 
identification is criminal processing, as most countries have a national or international 
database containing fingerprints and other personal information belonging to criminals. This 
means that it is theoretically possible to check the fingerprint of any traveller to see if he or 
she is indeed a convicted criminal, even without the person knowing of it. 
 
The obvious place to perform this check is at immigrations control, but people with the 
correct access may do this almost anywhere. All that is needed is a passport reader. One may 
argue that the ‘Faraday Cage’ on the passport covers will protect the information, but consider 
what happens when visiting a foreign hotel or cruise ship, as mentioned above. The passport 
is left in the reception, sometimes for the entire stay. The hotel will argue it is a insurance that 
the bill will be paid, but it also gives the staff ample time to investigate, and, if they have 
malicious intents, copy the passport itself or parts of it. 
 
The threat increases if, as the EU Data Protection Working Party [37] fears, the algorithm of 
the BAC key creation becomes publicly available on the Internet. As the expected effective 
life of the ePassport is 10 years, this is definitely possible. 
 
We can only assume that most citizens and private companies do not approve of governments 
having access to all or part of their access keys to secret data or protected facilities. Even 
foreign governments gain access to the data if the person ever visits the country. There is no 
limit to the lifetime of biometric data, especially fingerprints, so any government that has ever 
processed the person through immigrations in practise possesses his or her biometric data. 
There is very little clarity on how the biometrics databases will be protected from attacks, 
especially if an international database is to be used. This fact is not settling for anyone, and 
will probably be the seed to several public discussions and much frustration, we fear. 
 
9.6 Discussion of Control procedures 
In manual control every inspector needs to know about the security methods different 
countries have implemented. At least they need to have good enough overview to spot any 
fake passports. With an RFID tag in the passport the reader will connect this to a database. In 
that way the inspectors just have to be aware of anything suspicious, like if the holders 
information is not exactly the same in the passport book and the chip. It does not mean that 
the inspector does not have to look at the passport book for any security features that seem not 
accurate, but it does mean that it is more difficult to make a fake passport. You cannot simply 
change the picture anymore, because the RFID chip will contain the original one. 
 
The control procedure is outlined in Figure 6, taken from the ICAO “Biometrics Deployment 
of Machine Readable Passports”-report [24].   
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Figure 6 Typical Business Process of reading ePassports. 
This figure shows that if no RFID exists in the passport there a standard manual control will 
be initiated. If the document is valid the passport will be checked against a database (like the 
American one) to see if there is any irregularities. If the document is not valid a closer 
inspection will be done. 
 
If an RFID tag exists in the passport, one of two things will happen. Either the passport is 
presented to an RFID reader, or there is a manual check of security features. When a manual 
check is performed the passport will be deemed valid if nothing else suspicious appears while 
it is scanned as an MRP. Specifically, the data page, passport covers and the passport in 
general are inspected. When the passport is presented to an RFID reader, digital signatures 
will be checked. If these are not valid a closer inspection is preformed, if they are valid the 
MRZ will be compared with the information in the chip to see if there is anything suspicious 
there. If everything is OK the check against the database (watch list) will be performed, if 
something is strange the passport will again be inspected closer. 
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10 Conclusion 
10.1 RFID and Biometrics Conclusion 
RFID is the most important, discussed and well-known system of all automatic identification 
(Auto-ID) systems. During the last decades constant development of new applications of 
RFID has occurred. In ePassports, RFID is used for two reasons, more or less automatic 
scanning and the possibility to add biometric features in the passport. 
 
There are many challenges with RFID. Fortunately the area has been under lot of research the 
last years. RFID is mostly used to identify products in warehouses and in stores, so the chip is 
mostly tested for this type of application. Even though there are some differences between the 
uses when it comes to product identification and ePassports, there are several equalities as 
well. There has been a lot of research around the security aspects for RFID, so the technology 
becomes more and more secure. Most of the security methods used in product identification 
can also be used in passports. The main difference is that the data the chip contains are more 
important in passports. Therefore it is more important that there should be some kind of 
encryption in passport chips. 
 
Biometrics is a very good way of identifying individuals, as it does not require people to 
remember any passwords or tokens. An almost completely secure means of identification is 
always with them. However, even though most scientists believe that no two fingerprints or 
iris patterns are alike, the technical measuring equipment we currently possess is not yet exact 
enough to fully take advantage of the huge entropy of biometric characteristics. This means 
that errors may occur and false acceptance and rejection rates must be seriously considered. In 
addition, care must be taken to avoid the different types of attack the shortcomings of the 
computerized systems actually have. Finally, we urge that biometric information is protected 
sufficiently both in the ePassports and the corresponding database records. 
 
10.2 Conclusion for The ICAO Standard for ePassports 
The internationally applied standard for ePassports has been developed by the ICAO 
‘Technical Advisory Group on Machine Readable Travel Documents’, or the TAG/MRTD for 
short. The ICAO standard for machine-readable passports (MRPs) is outlined in a document 
called “Doc 9303 Part 1 for Passports”. This has not been updated since 2003, and the next 
version will come in two volumes. Volume two will contain the specifications for an 
enhanced MRP with biometric data encoded in a contactless integrated circuit (RFID) chip.  
 
As mentioned in chapter 9.2, the standard has to be well revised and considered. We feel that 
the ICAO TAG/MRTD group has done a relatively good job here, even though the standard 
has received much criticism from experts within security and privacy. The fact that part 1 of 
Doc 9303 has not been updated in full scale since 2003 interprets that the work is thorough, 
and that all inputs have been taken to consideration, though we find it alarming that the 
experts in the TAG/MRTD group have not been more critical themselves. A lot of the 
problems that has surfaced after implementation of ePassports could and should have been 
avoided. 
 
The standard itself is not updated that often, but the standard is based on many technical and 
non-technical reports. These have been updated fairly often. Especially the Supplement to 
Doc 9303 has been updated more or less continuously. The updating process of this document 
has been based on comments to Doc 9303 and the supplement by all TAG/MRTD member-
states. We believe that this kind of cooperation will produce a good result. 
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The most negative aspect about the standard is that it is just a guideline. The fact that the 
standard is more a guideline than a set standard results in different choices of which features 
countries are implementing. We believe it would be easier and better if all countries 
implemented similar security features and similar appearance features in the ePassports. At 
least it would make it easier to control the passports all over the world.  
 
10.3 Conclusion for National Implementation 
We have mainly focused on the US and Norway, and one of the reasons are that the United 
States started work on their ePassports earlier than any other ICAO member. That have 
resulted in several rounds with experts, the public and privacy organizations. Norway is the 
third country in Europe to implement biometrics in their passports, and can be seen as 
pioneers in this context. 
 
There are many aspects that must be considered before implementing ePassports. Security 
around the issuance and the use of ePassports is one thing, but it is most important that every 
individual’s privacy is protected as well as a nations government can. With privacy we mean 
the ability to hide personal information from other than those the individual choose to give the 
information to.  
 
The security of the international or national databases is one thing that has to be well thought 
of. If we look closer at such databases there are at least as many threats to them as any other 
database in a network. It is important that these databases are protected against the most usual 
attacks that appear in a network. They must also be secured as well as possible against 
hackers. If the databases come together to form one international, even global, database, the 
protection of this database has to be an international project. Even though the database itself is 
not a national problem for an international database, the clients connected to the database are. 
 
The US has already implemented a national database. This database contains information 
about the holder; including biometrics and the holders travel history. It will also contain some 
information about criminal records. Anyone that enters the United States is checked against 
the database, and if there are some irregularities the holder is further questioned. This 
database is a direct result of the 9/11 terror attacks against the US. We believe that the 
Americans feel this enhanced security is the best way to stop possible terrorists, but citizens 
from other countries may find it a breach of privacy. Even though many citizens are against 
this, we believe that many countries will implement a national database. Even countries that 
only have machine-readable passports implemented will probably find a database useful.  
 
Readers are, as previously mentioned, not a direct technical issue that the government in any 
country are responsible for. They are responsible in the way that they have to use 
manufacturers that are trustworthy. The reader itself has to be user-friendly, fast and reliable. 
The most important thing about the reader is reliability.  
 
We see it as a good logic that as many countries as possible implement biometrics in their 
passports as soon as possible, hopefully soon after or at the same time as they implement the 
machine-readable zone (MRZ). As long as a country is an ICAO member, they have to 
implement an MRZ by 2010. We also believe that the ICAO will argument that because 
biometrics is more secure it should be implemented as soon as possible. Maybe most 
countries will have both an MRZ and biometrics within 2010. Even though using biometric 
passports creates a higher security level than conventional passports, there could be a lower 
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security level in the issuance procedure. Hence, we do not recommend that any country start 
implementing biometrics in their passport before they can issue it in a secure way. Some of 
the countries that have implemented biometrics in Europe are Sweden (1 October 2005), 
Norway (3 October 2005) and Belgium (November 2004). Denmark will implement 
ePassports for 1 August 2006. 
 
10.4 Conclusion for Issuance 
The Norwegian and US systems for issuance of ePassports differ in that US citizens who 
already have a passport and meet certain criteria may apply for a new one by mail, and do not 
have to do this in person. We seriously question the wisdom in this approach, as no definite 
confirmation of the application is made. 
 
The five issues discussed in the report from the Norwegian Data Inspectorate are all current, 
and should be seriously considered by anyone issuing ePassports. First, the use of different 
private companies for development and personalization of the passports requires strict rules 
for what these companies are allowed to do or not, and what they are required to do or not. At 
the same time, it must be pointed out that the company does not have all the responsibility 
concerning security and privacy. The government is in the end responsible for everything and 
cannot transfer this burden to others. 
 
Second, the use of risk evaluations both continual and at strategic points can uncover several 
issues to security and privacy, and should be rigorously pursued. Third, the general population 
needs information to feel safe and protected. If this is prioritized, much insecurity and 
frustration may be avoided. The information to be provided should include what information 
is recorded, how the information is treated, how to correct information if errors are detected, 
how the information may possibly be used both by the citizen’s own government and others, 
and probably much more. Finally, the issuing authority must implement sufficient internal 
routines so that unnecessary errors may be prevented. 
 
10.5 Conclusion for Other Use of the ePassport and its Components 
Several parts of the passport are used in other situations than immigrations. Most individuals 
already have their names and birthdates, maybe even personal number in several databases 
with variable levels of security. Biometrics is used for identification and authorization in 
several private and corporate situations. Even the entire machine-readable zone is used for 
certain ticket ordering systems, making the data used for key generation in BAC much less a 
secret. This is a very serious concern, as the algorithm for key generation might become 
public if cracked some time during the next ten years. If this happens, BAC is practically 
useless. 
 
Another cause for concern regarding other use of Biometrics is that governments will have 
access to biometric keys to private and corporate property and secrets. It is quite obvious that 
the EU will not recall the use of fingerprints as the second biometric identifier, even if 
citizens may protest both against the connection to criminal databases and because of the 
increased use of fingerprints as identifiers in personal appliances. How this problem may be 
solved is yet unknown, maybe through careful protection of the stored data. Also, the Belgian 
government already keeps a national database with personal information of its citizens [34], 
and a case study of what the government has done to earn its citizens’ trust may result in a 
way to replicate the Belgian success 
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10.6 Conclusion for Control procedures 
The ePassport has been developed with effective immigration control in mind. The control 
can to some degree be automated. At present, passport control personnel (inspectors) have 
been required to know the characteristics of any country’s passport. Keeping track of all the 
different passports is a difficult job for the inspectors. A machine passport reader would 
probably do this job better and more accurate.  
 
Machine passport readers are already in use, but many of these only scan the machine-
readable zone. If RFID tags and biometrics are included in the passport, the inspection will go 
by faster than traditionally manual control. This is because the RFID information can be 
checked against the machine-readable zone and the information on the data page. With 
machine readers it will also be much easier to detect any fake passports. With an RFID chip 
or a machine-readable zone the passport will most likely be checked against a national or 
international database. This database will contain personal information about the passport 
holder, and in that way the inspectors just have to be aware of anything suspicious. 
 
10.7 Overall conclusion 
First, we find that the process of determining the specifics of the ICAO standard and different 
nations’ implementations of optional security and privacy protection measures worthy of 
some criticism. For several years, serious security and privacy risks both caused by choices 
made in the standard and by individual nations have been detected, discussed and more or less 
improved. Several of these could in our opinion have been avoided if more attention had been 
paid to details. One example of this is that the use of active RFID tags would make it possible 
to scan personal information in them from outside the home of the owner. The inability of the 
ICAO and individual governments to create a satisfactorily secure system without 
considerable efforts from security experts and privacy organizations is disturbing, yet sadly 
not surprising. In our opinion, this is one of the ePassport system’s most grievous flaws. 
 
On the other hand, there are several other concerns, many caused by different choices in the 
national implementations. For example, implementing a national or international database 
containing the personal information of all citizens or pass holders would greatly decrease the 
risk of passport fraud. However, this security measure will compromise the individual’s basic 
right to privacy unless serious constraints are made to the use of the database. We believe a 
study of the Belgian national database of all their citizens would provide guidelines for how 
such databases should be implemented, especially regarding the strict access restrictions, the 
extensive logging of any access to stored data and the citizen’s right to access the logs 
containing information about access to his or her own information. 
 
The Norwegian and US governments, among others, have both decided to set the effective 
lifetime for the ePassport to ten years. For several reasons, we find this to be a poor choice. 
As we have already mentioned in our “National Implementations” and “Issuance” sections, a 
ten-year lifetime causes many security, privacy and performance issues. A very serious 
concern is that RFID chips have never been tested for such a long time period, so there is no 
guarantee they will actually stay functional for ten years. Ten years also provides hackers and 
crackers with ample time to device methods to misuse the passports. The long lifetime 
seriously decreases the rate of improvement and further development of ePassport systems, 
which is a shame considering the rapid changes of both RFID and biometrics technology. 
 
The ICAO itself explicitly recommends the lifetime to be only five years, and both Sweden 
and Belgium have chosen to comply. In essence, there are so many good reasons to choose 
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five-year lifetime for ePassports we hope other governments, including our own, will follow 
their example. 
 
In general, we believe the ePassport system is closing on a secure enough level, but it is not 
quite there yet. We anticipate the next version of Doc 9303 and hope this document can 
produce more definite rules and guidelines. The countries that have already begun issuing 
ePassports may face somewhat critical issues if their security measures should fail, as we fear 
they might. The possible implementation of databases to support passport and identity 
verification may tip the scale in any direction. If sufficient privacy measures are implemented, 
this may be a valuable contribution to security, but if privacy is not well enough protected, the 
system will not be a success, as it will be difficult to implement worldwide due to privacy 
legislations. 
 
It is as we predicted early in our project. Security and privacy do not counteract each other, 
but are intertwined for good or for bad. Both must be considered, as must the way they affect 
each other. 
 
10.8 Further Work 
We believe it important that attention be paid to the further development of the international 
and national ePassport system. The ePassport is here to stay, but we predict that several 
changes and updates will occur. One of the major issues now is the implementation of 
national and international databases for verification of passports and people. We believe these 
databases will be implemented, but only if sufficient security and privacy measures are 
applied. This work will be very important for the success or failure of the ePassport program. 
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Annexes 
Annex A – Our e-mail to the Norwegian Security Authority NSM 
NB! Only available in Norwegian. 
 
 
To: postmottak.nsm@mil.no 
Subject: Forespørsel masteroppgave om biometriske pass - Til den/ dem det angår 
 
Hei, vi er fire femteårs IKT-mastergradsstudenter ved Høgskolen i Agder, avdeling Grimstad. 
Vi håper at denne mailen kan sendes til den/dem det måtte angå. 
 
Vi vil i våre hovedoppgaver våren 2006 ta for oss de nye, biometriske passene. Vi er fordelt 
på to grupper, som har noe forskjellig vinkling på oppgavene. Den ene gruppen fokuserer 
hovedsaklig på anvendt teknologi, den andre har hovedvekt på standardisering og 
implementasjon. 
 
Vi har fått beskjed fra vår studieleder, Stein Bergsmark, at det kan være nødvendig å varsle 
dere om våre oppgaver. Selv om all informasjon vi bruker er offentlig tilgjengelig, har han 
uttrykt at det kan oppstå bekymring når denne samles og settes i system. Dette kan være 
fullstendig ubegrunnet, men vi ønsker å være på den sikre siden. 
 
Grunnet mye og uoversiktlig informasjon om biometriske pass ønsker vi også kontakt med en 
organisasjon eller et firma som kan hjelpe oss. I den forbindelse lurte vi på om dere kunne 
være til hjelp, enten ved å være kontakt selv eller peke ut noen som kan hjelpe. 
 
Vedlagt er våre to proposals, som forklarer i mer detalj hva våre oppgaver går ut på. Vi håper 
på snarlig positiv tilbakemelding. 
 
 
 
Med vennlig hilsen 
Ingvar Narvestad 
Mona Forsbakk 
Linda W. Olsen 
Eili Bjelkåsen 
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Annex B – Basic Key Generation Algorithms for Ciphers used for 
Digital Signatures in ePassports  
(copied from www.Wikipedia.org.) 
 
RSA 
1. Choose two large prime numbers and such that , randomly and 
independently of each other. 
2. Compute . 
3. Compute the totient . 
4. Choose an integer e such that which is coprime to . 
5. Compute d such that . 
The public key consists of 
• n, the modulus, and 
• e, the public exponent (sometimes encryption exponent). 
The private key consists of 
• n, the modulus, which is public and appears in the public key, and 
• d, the private exponent (sometimes decryption exponent), which must be kept secret. 
 
DSA 
• Choose a 160-bit prime q. 
• Choose an L-bit prime p, such that p=qz+1 for some integer z and such that 512 ≤ L ≤ 
1024 and L is divisible by 64. 
Note: FIPS-186-2, change notice 1 specifies that L should only assume the value 
1024, and the forthcoming FIPS 186-3 (described, e.g., in SP 800-57) uses SHA-224, 
SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as a hash function, q of size 224, 256, 384, and 
512 bits, with L equal to 2048, 3072, 7680, and 15360, respectively. 
• Choose h, where 1 < h < p − 1 such that g = hz mod p > 1. 
• Choose x by some random method, where 0 < x < q. 
• Calculate y = gx mod p. 
• Public key is (p, q, g, y). Private key is x. 
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Note that (p, q, g) can be shared between different users of the system, if desired. 
ECDSA 
Initially, the curve parameters (q,FR,a,b,G,n,h) must be agreed upon. Also, the entity 
initiating communication must have a key pair suitable for elliptic curve cryptography, 
consisting of a private key dA (a randomly selected integer in the interval [1,n − 1]) and a 
public key QA (where QA = dAG). 
For the previously mentioned entity to sign a message m, it follows these steps: 
1. Calculate e = HASH(m), where HASH is a cryptographic hash function, such as SHA-
1. 
2. Select a random integer k from [1,n − 1]. 
3. Calculate r = x1(mod n), where (x1,y1) = kG. If r = 0, go back to step 2. 
4. Calculate s = k − 1(e + dAr)(mod n). If s = 0, go back to step 2. 
The signature is the pair (r,s). 
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Annex C – Our e-mail to the Norwegian Data Inspectorate and their 
response.  
NB! Only available in Norwegian. 
 
 
To:  postkasse@datatilsynet.no 
Subject:  Elektroniske pass , en mastergradsoppgave - til den/dem dette angår 
 
 
Hei, vi er to studenter ved Høgskolen i Agder(HiA), fakultet for teknologi i Grimstad. Vi 
følger masterutdanningen i Informasjons- og Kommunikasjonsteknologi, og skriver i disse 
dager vår avsluttende masteroppgave. Denne behandler sikkerhets- og personvernproblemer i 
de nye, biometriske passene. Vi har i den sammenheng lest deres rapport og pålegg fra 
tilsynet hos politidirektoratet 15.november i fjor, og ønsker å stille et par spørsmål til denne. 
 
Vi håper dere har tid og mulighet til å svare oss, det ville hjelpe vår oppgave. Som gjenytelse 
kan vi tilby dere å sende vår rapport når den er ferdig etter 29.mai, hvis dette er ønskelig. 
 
Våre spørsmål er: 
 
I rapporten ser det ut som dere godtar at BAC som autentisering er en sikker nok metode. Vi 
leste i høst en rapport skrevet av Ari Juels(fra RSA laboratories), David Molnar og David 
Wagner(begge fra UC-Berkely). Rapportens navn er ”Security and Privacy Issues in E-
passports”. I denne nevner forfatterne sin bekymring over at nøklen som brukes til BAC vil 
kunne være mulig å knekke i løpet av forholdsvis kort tid(få timer) ved hjelp av “brute force” 
på en vanlig laptop, hvis den er kort nok. Dette er allerede tilfelle i Nederland, som dere 
sikkert er klar over. Vårt spørsmål er da: Hvordan vet vi at nøklen er lang nok i de 10 årene 
passet skal fungere, gitt utviklingen i prosessorkraft og annen teknologi? 
 
Senere i rapporten deres nevner dere sjekkrutinene ved utstedelse av pass, og sier at ” En 
sammenlikning av de biometriske data i passbildet med biometriske data i et annet bilde 
gjøres sikrest maskinelt. En visuell sammenlikning kan medføre feil.” Denne linken: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/3389209.stm er til en artikkel skrevet av BBC. Artiklen 
inneholder et kort intervju med professor John Daugman ved University of Cambridge, 
utvikler av algoritmene for iris-gjenkjennelse som UK Passport Service UKPS testet på 
daværende tidspunkt, og en uttalelse fra Bernard Herdan, chief executive ved UKPS. 
Professor Daugman uttaler at maskiner er enda dårligere enn mennesker på å gjenkjenne trekk 
i biometrisk sammenheng. Betyr dette at denne teknologien har hatt en utvikling i det senere 
som har gjort den bedre egnet enn mennesker?  
 
Har dere også mulighet til å utdype litt mer om hva en risikovurdering innebærer? Hvordan 
den utføres, hva resultatene kan se ut som osv?  
 
Som tidligere sagt, vi håper dere finner tid og mulighet til å svare på våre spørsmål. 
 
 
Med vennlig hilsen 
Linda Walbeck Olsen og 
Eili Bjelkåsen 
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Svaret kom fra Atle Årnes, senioringeniør ved Tilsyns- og sikkerhetsavdelingen hos 
datatilsynet: 
 
 
Til Linda Walbeck Olsen og 
Eili Bjelkåsen 
 
Spørsmål 1) 
I rapporten ser det ut som dere godtar at BAC som autentisering er en sikker nok metode. Vi 
leste i høst en rapport skrevet av Ari Juels(fra RSA laboratories), David Molnar og David 
Wagner(begge fra UC-Berkely). Rapportens navn er "Security and Privacy Issues in E-
passports". I denne nevner forfatterne sin bekymring over at nøklen som brukes til BAC vil 
kunne være mulig å knekke i løpet av forholdsvis kort tid(få timer) ved hjelp av "brute force" 
på en vanlig laptop, hvis den er kort nok. Dette er allerede tilfelle i Nederland, som dere 
sikkert er klar over. Vårt spørsmål er da: Hvordan vet vi at nøklen er lang nok i de 10 årene 
passet skal fungere, gitt utviklingen i prosessorkraft og annen teknologi? 
 
Svar: BAC som autentisering er dårlige greier. Datatilsynet godkjenner ikke løsninger. Det er 
den behandlingsansvarlige (passmyndighetene) som er ansvarlig for tilstrekkelig sikkerhet. 
Problemet med BAC er at koden er kjent. Det hjelper ikke med all verdens kode dersom 
koden er satt sammen av kjente verdier som man kan skaffe fra andre steder. Jeg anbefaler at 
dere tar en titt på vedlagte uttalelse fra EU's Art 29 gruppe (vedlagt, se punkt 2.4a). 
 
Spørsmål 2) 
Senere i rapporten deres nevner dere sjekkrutinene ved utstedelse av pass, og sier at " En 
sammenlikning av de biometriske data i passbildet med biometriske data i et annet bilde 
gjøres sikrest maskinelt. En visuell sammenlikning kan medføre feil." Denne linken: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/3389209.stm er til en artikkel skrevet av BBC. Artiklen 
inneholder et kort intervju med professor John Daugman ved University of Cambridge, 
utvikler av algoritmene for iris-gjenkjennelse som UK Passport Service UKPS testet på 
daværende tidspunkt, og en uttalelse fra Bernard Herdan, chief executive ved UKPS. 
Professor Daugman uttaler at maskiner er enda dårligere enn mennesker på å gjenkjenne trekk 
i biometrisk sammenheng. Betyr dette at denne teknologien har hatt en utvikling i det senere 
som har gjort den bedre egnet enn mennesker? 
 
Svar: Svenske passmyndigheter tar alltid bilde selv av passøkeren. Svenskene benytter et 
lukket system. I Norge kan passøkeren levere gamle bilder hvor det kun er passøkerstedet 
som visuelt kontrollerer likhet. I Norge har det allerede skjedd en forveksling på dette punktet 
som svenskene dermed unngår. Man er i ferd med å implementere det samme system som 
svenskene har, i Norge. Poenget med med det elektronisk lagrede bildet i passet vil kunne 
være å benyttebiometrisk sammenlikning. Da må man også kontrollere at dette faktisk er 
mulig. Et trenet øye kontrollerer ikke biometrien, slikt gjøres "kun" maskinelt. 
 
Spørsmål 3) 
Har dere også mulighet til å utdype litt mer om hva en risikovurdering innebærer? Hvordan 
den utføres, hva resultatene kan se ut som osv? 
 
Svar: I henhold til personopplysningsloven § 13 og personopplysningsforskriften kapittel 2 
skal det settes opp en målsetting for  informasjonssikkerheten, en strategi, sette opp 
akseptansekriterier og foreta risikovurderinger. Risikovurderingene vil danne grunnlag for å 
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bestemme hvilke løsninger man kan implementere og hva slags sikkerhetsnivå som skal 
settes. Å ha som utgangspunkt at noe er 100% sikkert, er en stor tabbe. Man må klarlegge 
hvor det svakeste leddet ligger og vurdere tiltak og hvilken usikkerhet man aksepterer og 
hvordan denne usikkerheten skal håndteres. 
 
Ta gjerne kontakt om dere vil ha fyldigere tilbakemelding. 
 
Med vennlig hilsen 
 
Atle Årnes 
Datatilsynet 
